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INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has worked vigorously to address the leading is-
sues of patent law and to satisfy its mandate to bring uniformity to
patent law.' Despite internal procedures designed to minimize con-
flicting opinions,2 the court continues to issue inconsistent opinions
in some areas. The year 1990 was no exception.
The court again issued a large number of opinions on a variety of
topics. As always, a number of the court's published opinions
neither added to, nor elucidated broad areas of law, focusing in-
stead on fact specific situations. Nonetheless, a vast array of sub-
stantive, procedural, and jurisdictional issues were addressed and
clarified.
The following survey of the court's 1990 opinions highlights and
discusses these cases. This Article is organized according to topical
areas, with those cases having the greatest impact discussed in
greater detail.
I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL
In Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc. ,s the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expanded upon its analysis of the
little used doctrine of assignor estoppel. That doctrine "precludes a
patent assignor and those in privity with the assignor from contend-
ing that the patent is a nullity." 4 The term "nullity" was used delib-
erately with the intent of expanding the doctrine's effects to
defenses other than those alleging the invalidity of the patent in
suit. The court further developed the assignor estoppel doctrine,
1. See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (creat-
ing federal appellate court with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for, inter alia, patent
cases); S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 11, 15 (stating that Federal Circuit will provide needed uniformity at appellate level).
2. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 11, 17 (providing for increased stability in patent law by channeling appeals to a
single forum). This bill provided for a sufficiently diverse yet manageable caseload. Id. at 6,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11, 16.
The court's standard operating procedures provide a ten-day circulation among all judges
of all opinions to be published. Thus, all opinions are ostensibly reviewed by all judges for
inconsistencies. Those same procedures also provide a mechanism for withholding, or acting
upon en banc, opinions that would cause conflicts.
3. 903 F.2d 789, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1729 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4. Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 793, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1729, 1732 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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and provided insight unavailable since Diamond Scientific Co. v.
Ambico, Inc.,5 in which the court reaffirmed its commitment to the
doctrine.
In Shamrock, the Federal Circuit considered an appeal from a sum-
mary judgment in which the trial court held that the defendants' ac-
tivities infringed the plaintiff's patents, and rejected the defendants'
affirmative defenses and counterclaims of invalidity and unenforce-
ability.6 After upholding the trial court's infringement decision, the
Federal Circuit addressed the assignor estoppel doctrine. The court
analyzed the questions of privity, misrepresentation and duress, and
the applicability of the doctrine to inequitable conduct defenses. 7
On the issue of privity, the court explained that the concept of
privity, like the doctrine of assignor estoppel, is equitable in nature;
thus, it "is determined upon a balance of the equities." The court
focused on the relationship between the inventor and the person or
company alleged to be in privity with him.9 In reviewing the factors
considered by the trial court, the Federal Circuit noted such undis-
puted facts as: 1) the inventor'.s new position with the defendant
company; 2) his ownership of 50,000 shares of that company; 3) that
the alleged infringement began shortly after the inventor began em-
ployment with the defendant company; and 4) that the inventor was
in charge of the allegedly infringing activities. 10 The court con-
cluded that the defendant company "clearly availed itself of [the in-
ventor's] 'knowledge and assistance' to conduct infringement," and
upheld the trial court's finding that privity existed.1'
The court's privity analysis is important for several reasons. First,
the court seemed to isolate the equities involved in the privity analy-
sis from the overall equities of the case.' 2 By focusing only on those
facts that concerned the inventor's relationship with the defendant
company, the court may have unintentionally narrowed the analysis.
The privity question, as an equitable concern, should include con-
5. 848 F.2d 1220, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 2028 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
6. Shamrock, 903 F.2d at 790, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1729-30. While employed by Shamrock,
Robert S. Luniewski and another inventor obtained the patent-in-suit on an apparatus and
method for processing polytetraflouroethylene, and Luniewski assigned his rights in the pat-
ented inventions to Shamrock. Luniewski later left Shamrock, and became Medical Steriliza-
tion's vice president in charge of operations. Medical Sterilization went on to process
polytetraflouroethylene, giving rise to Shamrock's claim of patent infringement.
7. Id. at 791-96, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1730-34.
8. Id. at 793, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1732.
9. Id. (stating that "[t]he closer that relationship, the more the equities will favor apply-
ing the doctrine").
10. Id. at 794, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1732.
11. Id. at 794, 14 U.S.P.Q2d at 1733.
12. See id- at 793-94, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1732-33 (considering only equities involved in
relationship between inventor and company in privity analysis).
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sideration of the overall equities. As the court noted, privity is "like
the doctrine of equitable estoppel itself," in that it is equitable.
13
Therefore, the overall equities should play a role. Second, the
court's privity discussion provides a sorely needed update on its ap-
proach in such cases. As the Shamrock opinion demonstrates, many
of the assignor estoppel cases are over fifty years old.' 4 Thus, the
court has resurrected a largely forgotten topic.
Finally, the court distinguished those situations where the inven-
tor is a "mere employee" of the defendant corporation.15 The court
indicated that, in the proper circumstances, it might be willing to
recognize the established rule that there can be no privity between a
corporation and a mere employee for purposes of application of the
doctrine of assignor estoppel. This limit on privity is extremely im-
portant in today's highly mobile economy, where employees may
move several times during their career. 'Mayhem could result if
every time an inventor changed employers the new employer was
estopped from asserting the invalidity or unenforceability of one of
the inventor's patents.
1 6
The court next discussed the issue of misrepresentation and du-
ress as a defense to the application of assignor estoppel. It reaf-
firmed the rule enunciated in Diamond Sdentific that an assignor may
raise the "usual defenses to [the] contract of assignment."' 17 How-
ever, the court rejected the argument that fear of losing one's salary
and bonus was sufficient grounds to constitute duress.18
Finally, on the issue of inequitable conduct, the court refused to
bar consideration of assignor estoppel solely because a defense is
equitable. 19 Thus, the court held that the doctrine applies with
13. Id at 793, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1732.
14. See id. (citing privity cases decided between 1905 and 1949); see, e.g., Douglass v.
United States Appliance Corp., 177 F.2d 98, 101,83 U.S.P.Q. 41,42-43 (9th Cir. 1949) (hold-
ing no privity exists between assignor and remote successors in interest); Buckingham Prods.
Co. v. McAleer Mfg. Co., 108 F.2d 192, 195, 44 U.S.P.Q. 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1939) (recognizing
that privity exists between assignor and corporation where assignor controlled policy but
lacked voting control); Mellor v. Carroll, 141 F. 992, 993-94 (C.C.D. Mass. 1905) (contending
that privity exists between assignor and those who avail themselves of assignor's knowledge
and assistance).
15. See Shamrock, 903 F.2d at 794, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1732-33 (rejecting defendant's con-
tention that inventor was mere employee).
16. Cf D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1991) (reinstating rule of imputed
disqualification; requiring disqualification of entire law firm under certain circumstances).
17. Shamrock, 903 F.2d at 794, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1733 (quoting Diamond Scientific Co. v.
Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 2028, 2031 (Fed. Cir.), rert. dismissed, 487
U.S. 1265 (1988)).
18. Id. The court stated that "[e]mployment, salary and bonuses are valid consideration
for the assignment,... and to hold that fear of their loss constitutes duress or intimidation
would undermine every assignment by an employee-inventor." Id.
19. Id.
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equal force to assertions of inequitable conduct and to assertions of
invalidity.20 After reviewing the possible grounds for a finding of
inequitable conduct, the court determined that because the defend-
ant had alleged no facts to support such a finding, no genuine issues
of material fact existed, and thus summary judgment on that issue
was proper. The court noted that "in a proper case general princi-
ples of equity may preclude use of assignor estoppel to bar a viable
equitable defense arising from post-assignment events." 21 The
Shamrock opinion is troubling in this regard because it appears to
establish a much stricter rule than is desirable where the trial court
is charged with weighing the benefits of competing equitable doc-
trines, especially when the application of either rests on the same
general facts and circumstances. A totality of the circumstances test,
similar to that applied by the court in other contexts, would be more
appropriate in this situation. 22 It is likely, however, that, as the oc-
casion arises, the court will move to soften the blow of Shamrock and
bring it in line with its precedent on similar issues.
II. DAMAGES
The Federal Circuit has already answered most of the important
questions concerning the determination of patent damages. How-
ever, a number of subsidiary questions continue to arise, requiring
the court to refine further the means by which trial courts compute
damages. In three cases this year, the Federal Circuit elaborated on
both the reasonable royalty and lost profits analyses.
In Trell v. Marlee Electronics Corp. ,23 the court rejected the district
court's reasonable royalty determination where the rate was based
entirely on the existence of one other negotiated license. 24 The dis-
trict court held that six percent was the proper royalty rate on the
20. Id. (stating supposition that equitable defense could be total bar to assignment es-
toppel is at best incongruous).
21. Id. at 795, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734.
22. See Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 979, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1202, 1208-09
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying totality of circumstances test to determine willfulness); Pacific Fur-
niture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 n.9, 231 U.S.P.Q. 67, 69
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (sustaining finding of willful infringement in light of all circumstances).
23. 912 F.2d 1443, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
24. Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1448, 16 U.S.P.O.2d 1059, 1063 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (holding that district court's determination of reasonable royalty was improper).
In an earlier proceeding, the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court's liability judgment, and
held that Marlee had infringed Trell's patent on a security lock system for apartment houses
and other buildings. Id. The court then remanded the case to the trial court for a determina-
tion of damages. The trial court awarded Trell a total of $806,166, and Marlee appealed. Id.
at 1444-45, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1060.
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basis of one license. 25 The Federal Circuit, following the ruling in
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,26 rejected the single license as
insufficient. 27 The court noted that an established royalty is one
that has been "paid by such a number of persons as to indicate a
general acquiescence in its reasonableness by those who have occa-
sion to use the invention."' 28 The Federal Circuit then stated that,
absent a sufficient number of license agreements or other probative
evidence, the district court's finding of an established royalty was
error. The district court should have determined a reasonable roy-
alty through the fictional willing buyer/willing seller test.29 Under
that test, the court concluded that a number of factors must be con-
sidered and that it was error for the district court to determine a
reasonable royalty solely on the basis of the negotiated license.30
The court noted a number of other factors also applicable to the
royalty analysis that were in the record, including: 1) the previous
license was exclusive and covered more than just the patent in ques-
tion; 2) the infringement was for only one aspect of the patent in
suit; and 3) "the cost of producing that infringing aspect ... was
relatively small and did not contribute appreciably to Marlee's sales
price or profit." 3' The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court erred when it placed the burden on the infringer to rebut the
six percent royalty paid by a third party. Instead, the trial court
should have focused on the patentee's obligation to prove what a
reasonable royalty would be.32
The court remanded the case for proper consideration of a rea-
sonable royalty, 33 leaving to the trial court the decision of whether
to take additional evidence or to redetermine the proper royalty on
the basis of the evidence in the record. Trell follows the reasoning
25. Id. at 1445-46, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1061 (relating district court finding that six percent
was "established and reasonable royalty rate").
26. 718 F.2d 1075, 219 U.S.P.Q. 679 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
27. Trell, 912 F.2d at 1446, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1061 (citing Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski
Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078, 219 U.S.P.Q. 679, 682 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (stating that single
licensing agreement is insufficient proof of established royalty).
28. Id. (quoting Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1078, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 221).
29. Trell, 912 F.2d at 1446, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1061 (stating that willing buyer/willing
seller test must be used where no established royalty exists). Under that test, the trial court
uses "a willing-buyer/willing-seller concept, in which a suppositious meeting between the pat-
ent owner and the prospective [user] of the infringing product is held to negotiate a license
agreement." Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349, 193 U.S.P.Q, 385, 391,
amended, 557 F.2d 265, 196 U.S.P.Q. 204 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
30. Trell, 912 F.2d at 1446-47, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1061-62.
31. Id. at 1446, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1062. Apparently, the district court perceived the evi-
dence differently, stating: "The only evidence that I have is six percent." Id.
32. Id. at 1447, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1062 (criticizing district court's allocation of burden of
proof).
33. Id. at 1448, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1063.
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that an established royalty requires more than one negotiated li-
cense, and clarifies the parties' respective burdens regarding the in-
troduction of evidence on this issue.
The Federal Circuit addressed another interesting damages issue
in Kalman v. Berlyn Corp. 34 There, both parties appealed a damages
award made in the accounting phase of the trial.3 5 Dr. Kalman, the
patentee, appealed the district court's denial of his post-trial motion
to amend the pleadings to add as a plaintiff a corporation of which
he owned fifty percent. His motivation for adding the corporation
was the company's position as the sole licensee of the patent. The
district court denied Kalman's motion because it found that impor-
tant legal questions existed, including whether the company was an
exclusive licensee, and that the defendant would be prejudiced with-
out discovery on this question.3 6
The Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed on this issue. The
court determined that the parties dearly knew since early in the liti-
gation that Kalman and the company were a single entity for pur-
poses of damages. 37 Since the defendant had obtained discovery of
the company's business records, it was not harmed by the lack of any
additional discovery. The court emphasized that it was irrelevant
whether Kalman's company was an exclusive licensee. Instead, the
relevant issue was that a "sole licensee... ha[d] been shown to be
directly damaged by an infringer in a two supplier market," and
"the nexus between the sole licensee and the patentee [was] clearly
defined." s3 8 In such circumstances, "the sole licensee must be rec-
ognized as the real party in interest. ' 39 The court's decision is im-
portant because it indicates a preference that district courts focus on
awarding damages "adequate to compensate for the infringe-
ment." 40 By permitting joinder of the missing plaintiff, the court
ordered a decision on all parties' claims in a single suit, thus avoid-
ing duplicative litigation. The result was deemed neither harsh nor
unfair, largely because the parties referred to Kalman and the cor-
poration interchangably throughout the litigation. Thus, the court
concluded that it should not have come as a surprise to the defend-
34. 914 F.2d 1473, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35. Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1475, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1093, 1094 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
36. Id. at 1477, 16 U.S.P.O.2d at 1097.
37. Id. at 1480-81, 16 U.S.P..2d at 1098-99 (citing extensive evidence that parties were
aware that patentee and company were single entity).
38. Id. at 1482, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1099.
39. Id.
40. Id. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1099-100 (quoting and citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) as con-
gressional mandate that adequate remedies be given).
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ant that it would be held responsible for damages to the company-
licensee as well. 41
In addition, the court reversed the trial court's decision to deduct
taxes paid in Great Britain from Kalman's lost profits. The court
reasoned that foreign taxes should not be deducted from the dam-
age awards calculation because the federal government taxes those
awards as income. A deduction of the foreign taxes would result in
a double taxation of the recovery. 42 Further, any deduction of taxes
is fraught with difficulties because of the uncertainty of calculating
the total amount of taxes the plaintiff will pay in the year it will re-
ceive the award.43 Other income and deductions will affect the anal-
ysis, rendering the calculation unnecessarily burdensome.
The court also considered and rejected the defendant's argu-
ments in its cross-appeal that the trial court's calculations of certain
lost profits be reversed. The court upheld the trial court's inclusion
of labor as a fixed cost based solely on the testimony of the inventor
that no additional labor would be necessary to produce the in-
fringer's sales.44 The Federal Circuit also upheld the trial court's
decision to award an additional fifteen percent over sales price
solely on Kalman's testimony that he would have charged more for
his product if Berlyn had not been selling its infringing product.45
The court faced an unusual argument regarding the lost profits
analysis in Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing
Co. 46 In Beatrice Foods the trial court awarded Beatrice's predeces-
sor-in-interest $22,107,837.69 for New England Printing's infringe-
ment of the patents-in-suit on the basis of Beatrice's lost profits,
concluding that Beatrice satisfactorily proved all of the requisite ele-
ments of the lost profits analysis. 47 New England, in its appeal, ar-
gued that the royalties Beatrice would have been paid should be the
appropriate basis for damages, and that the district court errone-
41. Id. at 1482, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1100.
42. Id. at 1482-83, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1100 (citing Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) and holding that deduction of taxes by court is improper because
it leads to double taxation).
43. See id. (discussing difficulty of predicting tax deduction from damage award because
actual tax treatment of award is affected by many factors not known by court).
44. Id. at 1485, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1102.
45. Id. at 1485, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1102. This conclusion is particularly interesting be-
cause it accepts and sanctions a monopolistic pricing policy that is assumed, despite the fact
that the patentee was actually charging less than the infringer. Id.
46. 899 F.2d 1171, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
47. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d
1171, 1173, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (relating trial court holding that pat-
ent owner satisfied burden of proving lost profits by showing demand for patented product,
capability to meet demand, and no acceptable non-infringing products).
1164
PATENT LAW: 1990 SUMMARY
ously excluded this information from evidence. 48 The Federal Cir-
cuit disagreed, stating that the "district court was not required to
receive evidence pertinent to a determination of what royalty would
be reasonable, when a royalty was correctly held not to be the mea-
sure of damages." 49
New England further argued that Beatrice's evidence of lost prof-
its was incomplete, and therefore the district court erroneously
awarded damages based on lost profits. 50 However, the record re-
vealed that the incompleteness of Beatrice's evidence was due to
New England's destruction of its own sales records and New Eng-
land's concomitant refusal to admit that its own invoices or its cus-
tomers' purchase orders established sales. 51 In addition, the trial
court found that New England deliberately destroyed the relevant
information. Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court was justified in finding bad faith. 52 The court
also rejected New England's attempts to limit its damages to periods
for which records existed, stating: "[a]n infringer cannot destroy
the evidence of the extent of its wrongdoing, and limit its liability to
that which it failed to destroy.... Fundamental principles ofjustice
require us to throw any risk of uncertainty upon the wrongdoer
rather than upon the injured party."153 The court chastised New
England for raising this argument after it had failed to cooperate at
trial.5
4
Despite New England's lack of cooperation, the Federal Circuit
rejected the trial court's decision to "equate New England's gross
sales with [Beatrice's] lost profits damages."' 55 The court reversed
on this issue because it disagreed with the trial court's conclusion
"that New England as a tortfeasor had no manufacturing costs."
56
The Federal Circuit found this to be an improper standard upon
which to base lost profits, and the case was remanded for redetermi-
48. See id.
49. Id. (citing Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 523 (8th Cir.
1980)).
50. See id. at 1174, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1023 (setting out New England's argument that
plaintiff insufficiently proved infringing sales).
51. See id. (pointing out New England's responsibility for destruction of sales records).
52. See id. (upholding trial court's findings that destruction of evidence was deliberate).
53. Id. at 1175, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024 (quoting Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies &
Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 655, 225 U.S.P.Q. 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902
(1985)).
54. Id. at 1175-76, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024. The court stated: "New England provided no
actual amounts of infringing sales, offered no estimates of infringing sales, did not assist in
their reconstruction, and consistently denied the accuracy of [Beatrice's] evidence. While
New England argues that the figure chosen by the court is clearly erroneous, it has not shown
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nation of the amount of damages. The court, not unmindful of the
history of the litigation, reminded the trial court that it possessed
the authority to increase damages under section 284, "whether or
not such an award exceeds [the original award]."5 7
Beatrice Foods provides solid precedent for the proposition that an
infringer who destroys evidence of lost profits can still be liable for
those lost profits where enough material exists to create a reason-
able economic model of such profits.58 The destruction of evidence
may not only subject the infringer to sanctions, but also will not al-
low it to escape paying lost profits.
III. DISCOVERY FROM NONPARTIES
The Federal Circuit decided a case of exceptional importance to
patent litigators who seek information from third parties in patent
infringement suits. In Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co. ,59 the court
considered whether, and under what conditions, a patent owner can
obtain information, confidential or otherwise, from nonparties to a
patent infringement suit. The information sought in Micro Motion
related to the issue of damages in Micro Motion's suit against Exac
Corporation. 60 Micro Motion sued Exac in California district court
for infringement of its patent directed to Coriolis mass flowmeters.
During discovery, and prior to a partial retrial on the doctrine of
equivalents issue, Micro Motion sought information related to its
damages theory from several competitors. 61 The nonparties moved
to quash Micro Motion's subpoenas for documents and information
regarding customers, configuration and operation of competitors'
Coriolis mass flowmeters, sales and lost sales of competitors'
flowmeters, and invoices from sales of the flowmeters, as well as
subpoenas for depositions of representatives of the nonparties.
K-Flow, a nonparty, moved to quash Micro Motion's subpoena in
the New Jersey district court, which denied K-Flow's motion, and
ordered the disclosure of all of the information requested, except
for the names of K-Flow's customers. 62 Micro Motion appealed
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1177, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating agreement
with court's analysis of damages issue).
59. 894 F.2d 1318, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1696 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
60. Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., 894 F.2d 1318, 13 U.S.P.QJ2d 1696 (Fed. Cir.
1990). The Micro Motion opinion notes that two related appeals were considered with this
appeal and were dealt with in concurrently issued orders. Id. at 1319 n.1, 13 U.S.P.Q2d at
1696 n.1.
61. Id. at 1320, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1697. The trial court ordered all discovery, including
that for the later damages phase, if necessary, be closed at the same time. Id.
62. K-Flow is a division of Kane Steel Co., the named cross-appellant in the Federal
Circuit appeal. Id.
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from the denial of its request for K-Flow's customer lists, and K-
Flow appealed from the denial of its motion to quash.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the New Jersey district
court's denial of K-Flow's motion to quash. 63 After discussing the
damages theory upon which Micro Motion based its request, the
court noted that Micro Motion's proposed proofs would result in
"numerous additional mini-infringement trials on each competing
product under each of its patents and, if these efforts were unsuc-
cessful, [would require Micro Motion] to go on to [present proof] of
their unacceptability."6 Micro Motion argued that its need for dis-
covery was justified because of the trial court's order in the principal
suit against Exac cutting off all discovery simultaneously. The Fed-
eral Circuit rejected this contention, pointing to Micro Motion's fail-
ure to seek a ruling from the trial court on the practicability and
relevance of its various damage theories before the trial court au-
thorized discovery against uninvolved parties. 65 The court found
that Micro Motion neglected to reveal to the California court how
much time the jury would need to consider infringement by the ad-
ditional, competing products.
66
The Federal Circuit concluded that Micro Motion fell far short of
the required showing of relevance that would permit the requested
discovery. The court opined that more than a theoretical argument
in support of a damages theory is required to permit discovery from
a nonparty. In this case, however, the court overseeing the main
litigation reopened discovery without requiring such a showing.
67
Thus, the ancillary court, here the district court in New Jersey, was
obliged to consider the relevance of Micro Motion's theories before
granting the discovery requested. 68 Here that obligation was espe-
63. Id. at 1321, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1698. The district court relied on Micro Motion's argu-
ment that the requested information from K-Flow was relevant and necessary to the issue of
damages because the information was not available elsewhere. Id.
64. Id. at 1324, 13 U.S.P.Q2d at 1700. Micro Motion presented a long and tenuous
theory tojustify the information it sought. Micro Motion argued that it would be required to
prove, inter alia: 1) all models of competitors' Coriolis mass flowmeters are infringements (in
response to defendant Exac's probable argument that others offered acceptable noninfringing
substitutes); 2) if the jury found a competitor's model noninfringing, Micro Motion would
have to show that model is not an acceptable substitute; and 3) as proof of unacceptability of
K-Flow's products, a comparison of Exac's and K-Flow's customer lists, because those cus-
tomers who chose Exac demonstrate that the K-Flow products were unacceptable substitutes.
Id. at 1323, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1700.
65. Id. The trial court did not rule on whether any of Micro Motion's proposed damage
theories were too tenuous or burdensome. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. With respect to relevancy, the court required Micro Motion to show only that the
requested information somehow related to the pending action. Id. at 1321, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1698.
68. Id. at 1325, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1701. The court distinguished its earlier opinion in
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cially important because neither of the principal litigants had an in-
terest in limiting discovery from nonparty competitors. As a result,
neither party requested that the California district court consider
the relevance of the information sought from the nonparties.6 9 The
California district court's failure to fulfill that obligation made its
decision an abuse of discretion.
70
The court then determined whether Micro Motion's requests
were "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litiga-
tion" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1). 71 After determining that a "rigid" definition of the quoted
phrase was impossible because relevancy questions arise in diverse
situations, the court concluded that Micro Motion's mere allegations
of relevance were insufficient to justify the discovery requested.
72
Micro Motion bore the burden of establishing that each theory of
damages it proposed was actually "subject matter involved in the
pending action."' 73 The court compared its failure to do so to the
situation that would have occurred had Micro Motion brought suit
against K-Flow "on a mere suspicion of infringement. ' 74 In such a
case, discovery would not be permitted on the basis of the allegation
alone.75 Similarly, because K-Flow's infringement was irrelevant to
the subject matter of the main suit, the court concluded that Micro
Motion's request was a "fishing expedition" in which Micro Motion
was "unmoored and trolling. '"76
Micro Motion provides a fairly clear indication of the type of proofs
the court will require from litigants before it will allow discovery
from nonparties. As expected, the case clearly establishes that the
Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1034, 1038
(Fed. Cir. 1987), in which ancillary courts were counseled to be "especially hesitant" to pass
judgment on relevancy. Id. at 1325, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1698. The NewJersey court required
Micro Motion to show only that the requested discovery "somehow relates to its pending
California action," and then accepted Micro Motion's theories as establishing relevance. Id.
In response to this, the Federal Circuit stated that "the caution by this court against an ancil-
lary court considering relevancy does not preclude such consideration where there are serious
relevancy questions that have not been given meaningful consideration in the main litiga-
tion." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1324, 13 U.S.P.Q2d at 1700.
71. Id. at 1326, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1701 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). The Rule
states that parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it related to the claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
72. Id. at 1326, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1702.
73. Id. at 1327, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1702.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1327, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1703. Similarly, the court quashed Micro Motion's
deposition subpoenas because they covered "the same matters as the documents and things"
in Micro Motion's other requests. Id. at 1328, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1703.
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burden of proving the relevance of proposed damage theories is on
the party seeking discovery. Moreover, the decision expresses a
clear preference that the court presiding over the main litigation
make this determination. If, however, that court is not requested to
make the relevance determination, or failed to do so, Micro Motion
places that responsibility on the ancillary court. Thus, litigators
should insure that the proper relevance determination is made
before initiating nonparty discovery. On the other side of the coin,
nonparties can hope to limit or prevent discovery that is not shown
to be relevant to the main litigation. The decision also gives the
ancillary court more authority than seemed apparent after the
court's decision in Truswal Systems Corp. v. Hydro-Air Engineering, Inc. 
77
IV. JURISDICTION
The Federal Circuit continued to define the limits of its jurisdic-
tion through two important cases. First, in Aerojet-General Corp. v.
Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd. ,78 the court issued a long-
awaited en banc opinion from an earlier decision. The Federal Cir-
cuit held that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), it has exclusive
jurisdiction over nonfrivolous compulsory counterclaims for patent
infringement where the original action was properly brought in a
federal district court.
79
The Aerojet opinion reviewed the jurisdiction issue in the context
of: 1) the court's prior jurisdictional decisions and the impact of
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. on them;80 2) the well-
pleaded complaint rule; and 3) the purposes of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), which created the Federal Circuit
and defined its jurisdictional boundaries.81 The court concluded
that a sensible reading of section 1295(a)(1)'s coverage included
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Truswal Systems decision).
78. 895 F.2d 736, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1670 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
79. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 886 F.2d 1310
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (en banc). In Aerojet, the appellant, Aerojet, sued Machine Tool Works, a
competitor, on nonpatent claims. Machine Tool Works, in a compulsory counterclaim, al-
leged inter alia patent infringement by Aerojet. The district court stayed the proceedings and
ordered aribitration of all claims. The court issued a sua sponte order on May 23, 1989 re-
questing briefing from the parties and interested amicus curiae on whether or not, in light of
Christianson v. Colt Indus., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), the court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal
where the district court's jurisdiction over the complaint was not based on section 1338(a) but
a section 1338(a) counterclaim existed. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oer-
likon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d at 738, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1672. On October 5, 1989, the court
issued an order announcing the decision and promised that an opinion would follow. Id. at
738-39, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1672 (citing order).
80. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
81. Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (1982)) (hereinafter FCIA).
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nonfrivolous compulsory counterclaims for patent infiingement.8 2
Aerojet is consistent with the earlier cases that suggested this re-
suit, and also provides the first definitive statement concerning the
effect of counterclaim practice on the court's appellate jurisdic-
tion. 3 Previously, the court had applied the well-pleaded complaint
rule to jurisdictional questions under section 1295(a)(1) to deter-
mine whether a case "arose under" the patent laws.
8 4
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in Christianson v. Colt In-
dustries Operating Corp. ,85 held that the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
turns not on whether patent issues are raised, but on whether,
under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a case legitimately "arises
under" the patent laws within the meaning of section 1295(a)(1). 86
Although the Court in Christianson held that the mere presence of
patent issues in a case did not create Federal Circuit jurisdiction, the
Federal Circuit believed that the case was important to its analysis in
Aerojet because Christianson upheld the application of the well-
82. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
739 & n.4, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1670, 1672 & n.4. The court commented that it may exercise juris-
diction over any "appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States ... if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338." Id.
83. See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1080, 231 U.S.P.Q 178, 180 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) where consolidated case included
patent claim filed as a counterclaim); Schwartzkopf Dev. Corp. v. Ti-Coating, Inc., 800 F.2d
240, 244, 231 U.S.P.Q. 47, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (indicating that jurisdiction over counterclaim
containing patent claims would have been proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) had counter-
claim not been withdrawn); Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 825 F.2d 604, 608, 3 U.S.P.Q2d 1590,
1593 (1st Cir. 1987) (transferring to Federal Circuit an appeal from denial of preliminary
injunction that considered only antitrust and unfair trade practices issues because "the de-
fendant included a viable patent counterclaim" in its answer). In Xeta, the Federal Circuit did
not discuss the jurisdictional issue, considering the First Circuit's decision as the "law of the
case." Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280, 1281, 7 U.S.P.Q2d 1471, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 815-16).
84. See, e.g., Ballard Medical Prods. v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527, 531, 3 U.S.P.Q2d 1337,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(holding that mere presence of patent issue, absent patent claim, is
sufficient to create jurisdiction); Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 518-19, 5
U.S.P.Q2d 1269, 1270-71 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying well-pleaded complaint rule and deny-
ing jurisdiction); Atari, Inc. v.JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1424, 223 U.S.P.Q 1074,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding Federal Circuit subject matterjurisdiction when claim arises
under patent laws).
85. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
86. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809-10 (1988). In Chris-
tianson, petitioners brought an antitrust action against Colt for tortious actions under sections
one and two of the Sherman Act. Id. at 805. Later, Christianson filed a motion for summary
judgment which raised a patent issue only tangentially related to the original complaint. Id at
806. Following the district court's grant of summary judgment on the antitrust and tortious
interference claims, Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit transferred the
case to the Seventh Circuit, for lack ofjurisdiction, and that court concluded that the Federal
Circuit was "clearly wrong" on the jurisdiction issue and transferred it back. The Federal
Circuit then concluded that Seventh Circuit was "clearly wrong," yet heard the case and re-
versed the district court's ruling. Id. at 806-07. The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal
Circuit's jurisdictional conclusion, stating that the action did not arise under the patent stat-
ute for purposes of section 1338, id. at 814, but disagreed with the Federal Circuit's decision
to address the merits in the interest ofjustice.
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pleaded complaint rule to section 1295(a)(1). 8 7
The Aerojet opinion notes, however, that neither Christianson nor
the court's own precedent required such a wooden application of
the well-pleaded complaint rule that it would preclude Federal Cir-
cuit jurisdiction where a nonfrivolous patent counterclaim is as-
serted.88 This result follows logically from the rule that federal
district court jurisdiction is not defeated where a counterclaim pro-
vides an independent basis for jurisdiction, even if the complaint
was dismissed or defective.8 9 Since section 1295(a)(1) speaks in
terms of the district court's jurisdictional basis, and not in terms of
the "complaint," the court reasonably concluded that as long as the
case "arises under" the patent laws exclusive appellate jurisdiction
lay with the Federal Circuit. 90 The court reasoned that while the
well-pleaded complaint rule was a useful tool in analyzing a counter-
claim, it should not be used to limit the court's jurisdictional analy-
sis only to complaints. 91
The Aerojet opinion also considered the impact of the legislative
history of the FCIA on its analysis. 92 The court concluded that,
while Congress did not intend that every patent issue be brought to
the Federal Circuit, asserting jurisdiction over cases in which parties
bring compulsory patent counterclaims would serve Congress' rea-
sons for passing the legislation-to reduce forum shopping in pat-
ent cases and to foster uniformity in the patent laws. Exercising
jurisdiction over such counterclaims would prevent manipulation of
appellate court jurisdiction by "unscrupulous plaintiffs]" who
could accomplish that result "by the timing of the amendments to
[their] complaint[s]." 9
3
Although Aerojet represents a rational resolution of a question of
significant importance to the patent bar,94 the decision also raises
many new questions. Most importantly, it is unclear whether Aerojet
will provide Federal Circuit jurisdiction over permissive counter-
claims. While such a result might seem to follow logically, the fact
that failure to raise a compulsory counterclaim can have preclusive
87. Id. at 814.
88. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
741, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1670, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 742-43, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1675-76.
90. Id. at 742, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1675.
91. Id. at 743-44, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1676-77.
92. Id. at 744-45, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1677 (citing H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 20-22 (1981) and S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 6, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6).
93. Aerojet-Gen Corp., 895 F.2d at 744-45, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1677.
94. See id. at 738, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1672 (stating that case taken en banc because of
,.exceptional importance" of issue).
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effect on a later attempt to raise that claim, while the same result
does not apply to permissive counterclaims, might dictate a different
result. On the other hand, once the claim is properly inserted into
the action, it can become an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion. At that point it is arguable that the case "arose under" the
patent laws. Unfortunately, the court gave no real clues as to the
direction it might take if such a case were to arise.95
The second case in which the court addressed its jurisdiction was
Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc.96 That case consid-
ered another of the court's unique jurisdictional statutes, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(2), which allows appeals from otherwise interlocutory de-
cisions in patent cases where the judgment is "final except for an
accounting." 97 In Johannsen, the parties appealed a judgment that
denied relief for plaintiff's patent claims, but which found the de-
fendant liable for unfair 'competition. 9s The court held that the de-
cision was not "final" within the meaning of section 1292(c)(2)
because that section only allows for interlocutory appeals when an
accounting is pending "in a civil action for patent infringement. " 99
Although patent claims were raised at trial, the only matters left for
an accounting were plaintiff's unfair trade competition claims. The
situation before it was, in the court's view, indistinguishable from
one where the patent owner loses at trial. However, in the latter
case, the judgment is final, and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295, rather than under section 1292(c)(2), making the compari-
son inappropriate. 10 0 The court interpreted section 1292(c)(2) in a
straightforward manner, and concluded that nonpatent claims must
be "completely final" before they may be appealed. 10
95. See id. at 739, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1672 (choosing to leave the permissive counterclaim
issue "for another day").
96. 918 F.2d 160, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1699 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (1988).
98. Johannsen v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 918 F.2d 160, 161, 16
U.S.P.Q2d 1697, 1697-98 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The parties first requested certification for imme-
diate appeal under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those motions were
withdrawn, however, after the parties mistakenly concluded that appeal of right existed under
section 1292(c)(2). Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1697.
99. Id. at 162, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1698.
100. Id. at 163, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1698-99. Hypothesizing more than was necessary, the
court attempted to compare appealability as final under section 1295 with nonappealability as
interlocutory under section 1292(c)(2). Id. at 162, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1698-99. This compari-
son was misleading because a final judgment cannot, by definition, be interlocutory. Section
1292(c)(2)'s inapplicability to the denial of "pure" patent claims arises because the judgment
is final, and thus appealable under section 1295. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988) (granting
federal court jurisdiction over final trial courtjudgments). Presumably, the court meant to say
that the otherwise final decision against the patentee was made interlocutory by the existence
of additional nonpatent claims and that section 1292(c)(2) was not intended to include such
nonpatent claims.
101. Id. at 163-64, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1699.
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Finally, the court noted that the purpose of section 1292(c) (2) was
in part "to prevent a great burden of expense to litigants in actions
to determine the validity of patents, where an accounting is in-
volved."10 2 Thus, the right to appeal was never intended to be as
broad as the parties proposed. The Johannsen opinion applied a
common sense interpretation to the statute, and demonstrates the
pitfalls that await those who fail to read the court's jurisdictional
statutes carefully.
Judge Newman's concurrence in Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing and Lithographing Co. '0 3 also contains an interesting jurisdic-
tional analysis. Beatrice Foods concerned an appeal from the damages
award in a patent infringement action.' 0 4 Acting en banc, the ma-
jority opined that it had the authority to assign a case, on remand, to
a differentjudge.10 5 This issue resulted from New England's charge
that the district judge presiding over the damages phase was biased.
Judge Newman stated that the case was taken en banc pursuant to
the court's Standard Operating Procedures "in order to delete from
the proposed panel opinion the discussion of the judicial bias is-
sue."' 06 Judge Newman attacked the court's decision to avoid this
issue, arguing that "the issue of judicial bias had been properly
raised on this appeal, and that it [was] not frivolous."' 1 7 Citing
Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.,108 she argued that the court should
decide all issues on appeal that reach the court because of its as-
signed exclusive jurisdiction. Judge Newman concluded that Sec-
ond Circuit precedent, which would control on this "procedural"
issue, required the court to review the judicial bias issue.109 The
concurrence did not reach the merits of the judicial bias issue, but
noted that the court did a disservice to the parties by not addressing
the issue."l 0 Nonetheless, it appears that a majority of the court is
still willing to forego consideration of certain collateral issues, such
102. Id. at 163, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1699 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1890, 69th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1927)).
103. 899 F.2d 1171, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
104. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing damage awards).
105. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171,
1177 n.1, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1025 n.I (Fed. Cir. 1990).
106. Id. at 1180 n.2, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027 n.2 (Newman, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 1177, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025 (Newman, J., concurring).
108. 747 F.2d 1422, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
109. Beatrice Foods, 899 F.2d at 1180, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027 (Newman, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman reasoned that because the issue ofju-
dicial bias on remand would have been reviewable by the regional circuit, there can be little
doubt that they are equally reviewable by the Federal Circuit. It would have been preferable
that the court address this matter in its opinion so that it would be clear to the litigants
whether it had been considered. Id.; see Benberiston v. United States, 866 F.2d 493, 499 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (considering judicial bias in appeals on merits and declining requested remand to
different judge). The court generally follows the law of the regional circuit when considering
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as the judicial bias claim raised here, in favor of a more economical
disposition. 11 Beatrice Foods also provides a rare glimpse into the
internal mechanisms that govern the way the court conducts its
business.
Late in the year, the court addressed yet another jurisdictional is-
sue in Registration Control Systems, Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc.,' 1 2 which
considered the effect of a delay between the filing of a post-trial mo-
tion and the memorandum in support of that motion.' 13 Following
the district court's decision to grant a new trial, the defendant sub-
mitted a motion for summary judgment attacking the validity of the
patent in suit, which the court granted. However, the motion lacked
specificity, and the memorandum in support was filed later. Thus,
the "exact issue before [the court was] whether the District Court
retained jurisdiction under its procedural rules to decide the [post
trial] motion for summary judgment." 14 Resolution of the ques-
tion hinged upon the interplay between Rules 59(a) and 7(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The former establishes the
grounds for granting a motion for a new trial, 115 while the latter
governs all motions.'
16
issues not specific to its jurisdiction. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1423,
223 U.S.P.Q. 1074, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
111. It is important to note, however, that Beatrice Foods was decided without many of the
court's new members, specifically Judges Lourie, Clevenger, Rader, and Plager, and thus the
outcome could differ significantly if the issue is raised again.
112. No. 90-1213 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 20, 1990).
113. Registration Control Sys., Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., No. 90-1213, slip. op. at 2-3
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 20, 1990). On appeal, Registration Control asserted for the first time that
appellant Compusystem's motion was deficient under Rule 7. Id. at 2. Following a jury ver-
dict, Compusystems filed a motion for new trial "on all issues," asserting that the verdict was
"against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. Compusystems later filed a motion for
summary judgment, which was granted. Id. Registration Control contended that the motion
for new trial was deficient under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires
motions to "state with particularity the grounds therefor, and... set forth the relief or order
sought." Id. at 2 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 7). Therefore, the magistrate granting the motion
for new trial and summary judgment lacked jurisdiction.
114. Id. at 4.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) states:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues
(1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for
which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the
United States; and (2) in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for
which rehearing have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of the
United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without ajury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and
direct the entry of a new judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
116. Id, at 5-6. The relevant language from Rule 7(b)(1) states: "[a]n application to the
court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be in
writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order
sought." Id. (emphasis added).
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Registration Control required the court to determine whether Com-
pusystems' unaccompanied motion was sufficiently particular to
meet Rule 7's requirement. Unfortunately, the court demurred.
The panel recounted the policy behind Rule 7 and reviewed the re-
gional circuit's decisions in the area. 1 7 While not finding any con-
trolling Second Circuit authority, the court determined that
discretion rested with the district court to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether the motion for a new trial was sufficiently
particular. 18
The court declined to consider whether the facts met Rule 7's re-
quirements because the district court had found no facts relevant to
the jurisdictional issue."19 Consequently, it remanded the case for a
determination of whether the words "against the manifest weight of
the evidence" and "on all issues" satisfied Rule 7, "a task best ad-
dressed first by the trial court."' 2
0
The Registration Control court refused to decide whether the sum-
mary judgment motion was sufficiently particular as a matter of law.
This action presented a rare situation in which the court remanded a
purely legal question, the trial court's jurisdiction, upon which
hinged the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, for factual find-
ings, rather than deciding the issue itself. Thus, while Registration
Control did not resolve the issue at hand, the opinion reemphasizes
the need for parties to obtain adequate findings, and for the trial
court to make findings sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate
review.
V. PATENT TERM EXTENSION
The Federal Circuit decided two cases of interest in the area of
patent term extensions, governed by 35 U.S.C. § 156.121 First, in
117. See id. at 5 (stating that," [t]he purpose of the particularity requirement in Rule 7 is to
afford notice of the grounds and prayer of the motion to both the court and to the opposing
party, providing that party with a meaningful opportunity to respond and the court with
enough information to process the motion correctly").
118. Id. at 9. Compare Stinebower v. Scala, 331 F.2d 366, 367 (7th Cir. 1964) (holding that
claims such as "the court erred in striking portions of plaintiff's complaint," and "the court
erred in admitting evidence which should have been excluded" are vague, indefinite, and
lacking in the specificity required by Rule 7(b)(1)) and Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.
Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747-48 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (suggesting nature of plaintiffs employment
relationship as method for establishing jurisdictional facts) with St. Mary's Hosp. v. Heckler,
753 F.2d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1985) (considering motion identifying "two specific errors in
reasoning" and requesting that the court "modify or clarify" its remand order).
119. Registration Control Sys. Inc. v. Compusystems, Inc., No. 90-1213, slip op. at 9 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 20, 1990).
120. Id. at 8.
121. A patent term extension is permissible if, among other things, the product was "sub-
ject to a regulatory review period" and "the permission for the commercial marketing or use
of the product after such regulatory review period [was] the first permitted commercial mar-
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Glaxo Operations UK, Ltd. v. Quigg, 122 the court considered the import
of section 156's definition of "product" as "the active ingredient of
a new drug, . . . including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient."1 23
Glaxo sought a patent term extension for its patent claiming
cefuroxime axetil, an antibiotic drug, which is the "active ingredi-
ent" in its product CEFTIN.124 Glaxo argued, and the court agreed,
that "product" as used in this section included only three categories
of compounds: an active ingredient; a salt of an active ingredient; or
an ester of an active ingredient. 125
Glaxo also marketed two salts of cefuroxime under the trade-
marks ZINACEF and KEFUROX.126 The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) first approved ZINACEF and KEFUROX in 1983 and
1986, respectively. CEFTIN first received FDA approval in 1987.
While Glaxo's three products were each a salt or ester of cefurox-
ime, the "active ingredient" in CEFTIN is the ester of cefuroxime,
and the "active ingredient" in ZINACEF and KEFUROX is the salt
of cefuroxime. The court considered this difference important, be-
cause section 156 defines "product" as only including the "active
ingredient" of the drug in question or the active ingredient's salts or
esters.'27 The court rejected a meaning other than the plain mean-
ing of "product" as used in section 156(f)(2), noting that "the terms
'active ingredient,' 'salt,' and 'ester' had well-defined, ordinary,
common meanings when Congress enacted" the Drug Price Compe-
tition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.128 Thus, since
Glaxo's "product" CEFTIN had as its active ingredient cefuroxime
axetil, an ester of cefuroxime, while the prior approved products'
active ingredients were salts of cefuroxime, the court concluded that
the patented "product" had not been previously approved or used
prior to the approval of CEFTIN. 129
keting or use of the product under the provision of law under which such regulatory review
period occurred." 35 U.S.C. § 152(a)(4)-(5).
122. 894 F.2d 392, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1628 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
123. Glaxo Operations UK, Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 394, 13 U.S.P.Q2d 1628, 1629
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(0(2)).
124. Id. at 394, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1629. Cefuroxime axetil is an ester of cefuroxime, an
organic acid. Id.
125. See id. at 400, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1634 (concluding that plain reading of statute sup-
ported Glaxo's construction). The Commissioner had urged that Congress intended "prod-
uct" to mean any "new chemical entity" or "new active moeity," thus encompassing all acid,




128. Id. at 398, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1632.
129. Id. at 399-400, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1633-34 (adopting Glaxo's construction of statute
and determining that the product in question did not fall under section 156(0(2)).
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Glaxo clarified an important outstanding question under section
156-whether patent term extensions should be granted to prod-
ucts based solely on their active ingredient or whether the "new ac-
tive moiety" test championed by the Commissioner is more
appropriate.' 30 It is now evident that for purposes of patent term
extensions, a "product" which undergoes an FDA review period is
entitled to an extension unless that product contains an active ingre-
dient, or a salt or ester of that active ingredient, that has already
undergone an FDA approval process for "commercial marketing."
This should entitle a significant number of patented drugs to patent
term extensions under section 156.131 After Glaxo, only the ap-
proval of a drug product which contains the same active ingredient
or a salt or ester thereof will block the extension of a new patented
drug product.
In another section 156 opinion, Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v.
Quigg,13 2 the Federal Circuit considered the applicability of section
15 6(g) to the definition of "regulatory review period" in section
156(a)(4). The court held that the limits incorporated in section
156(g)(6) act only to describe the limitation that applies to patent
term extensions available under the Act.13 3 "Regulatory review pe-
riod," as used in section 156(a)(4), is defined by sections 156(g)(l)-
(3).134 Thus, under section 156(g)(6), the maximum extension is
five years for 1) patents issued after the enactment of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Act),
and 2) for patents issued prior to the Act's enactment but for which
no exemption had been applied as of that date. 13 5 For patents is-
130. Id. at 394, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1629.
131. This was, in fact, one of the Commissioner's main arguments for a broader reading
of section 156(0(2). See id. at 396, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1631 (citing Commissioner's argument
that fewer patents should be eligible for extensions than plain meaning of section suggests).
The court, however, rejected the Commissioner's policy argument, stating that "[w]e cannot
say whether the meaning the Commissioner ascribes to section 156(0(2) would provide a
better balanced policy for patent term extensions. Nevertheless, that is not the issue before
the court. Striking balances in legislative language is Congress' job. Here Congress utilized
its constitutional powers vigorously, providing precise statutory definitions." Id. at 399-400,
13 U.S.P.O.2d at 1633.
132. 917 F.2d 522, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
133. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 527-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1549,
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
134. Id. at 527, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1553. Section 156(g)(1)(A) states, in pertinent part:
(g) For purposes of this section, the term "regulatory period" has the following
meanings...
(1)(A) In the case of a product which is a new drug .... the term means the
period described in subparagraph (B) to which the limitation described in para-
graph (6) applies.
35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(1) (1988).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A)-(B) (1988); see Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 525, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1551 (reviewing statutory requirements).
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sued before the effective date of the Act and after the commence-
ment of the regulatory review period, but prior to approval of
marketing or use, the maximum extension is two years.'
3 6
In Hoechst, however, the FDA approved the drug in question
before the effective date of the Act, yet Hoechst was able to meet the
sixty-day deadline for requesting an extension.13 7 Thus, its request
fell outside the specific limitations enunciated by section 156(g)(6).
The trial court, in agreement with the Commissioner, determined
that the extensions enumerated in the Act were a reflection of con-
gressional intent to limit the maximum extension to five years.
Since Hoechst's situation would require an extension of 6.8 years,
the trial court concluded that Congress must have intended to ex-
clude such patents from the Act's provisions altogether.
3 8
The Federal Circuit disagreed. Although it agreed that none of
the section 156(g)(6) limitations applied, the court disagreed that
Congress's intent to limit the maximum extension period was more
important than its intent to stimulate research and development in
new pharmaceuticals.1 3 9 While acknowledging the loophole that
Hoechst had identified, the court nonetheless concluded that the
proper interpretation of the statute was to exclude from the defini-
tion of "regulatory review period" the temporal limitations of sec-
tion 156(g)(6).140 Since Hoechst satisfied the remaining applicable
requirements for patent term extension, the court held that
Hoechst's patent was entitled to the 6.8 year patent term extension
and remanded for appropriate action.'
4 '
Hoechst represents a valid interpretation of section 156, albeit one
which exemplifies the court's history of favoring results that tend to
strengthen the patent grant. The district court's and Commis-
sioner's interpretations of this congressional oversight were equally
plausible. 142 Nonetheless, the court chose the path that will include
the greatest number of patents within the extension statute. Viewed
together, Glaxo and Hoechst exhibit the court's tendency to favor in-
terpretations that uphold the vitality and potential of the patent
136. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(C); see Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 525, 16 U.S.P.Q2d at 1551 (citing
and discussing statutory language).
137. Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 525, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1550; see 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1) (requiring
that patent owners submit application "within the sixty-day period beginning on the date the
product received permission under the provision oflaw under which the applicable regulatory
review period occurred for commercial marketing use").
138. Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 526, 16 U.S.P.Q2d at 1552.
139. Id. at 528-29, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1553-54.
140. Id. at 529, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1554-55.
141. Id. at 529, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1554.
142. See id. at 529, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1555 (acknowledging that Commissioner's denial of
extension was motivated by reasonable interpretation of congressional intent).
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right. In each case, the result effectively added value to existing
patents.
VI. PROCESS PATENTs-ITC
Although not solely a patent decision, the Federal Circuit decided
a case of special interest to patent lawyers who are involved in cases
brought under section 337 of the Tariff Act before the International
Trade Commission (ITC). 143 That case, Amgen, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission,' 44 considered, inter alia, whether the
"process" provisions of section 337 permit exclusion of articles
made by an unpatented process that utilizes a patented article. 145
The provision at issue was section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii), which permits
the exclusion of articles from importation into the United States if
those articles "are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or
by means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforcea-
ble United States patent."'
146
Amgen argued that the phrase "a process covered by the claims of
a... patent" should allow for the exclusion of such articles because
the process performed abroad would, if performed in the United
States, infringe Amgen's patent solely because the process used the
Amgen patented article. Therefore, Amgen argued, the article
claims of its patent "cover" the process performed abroad, and the
importation of goods made from that process should be within the
reach of section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii).1 47 The court disagreed.148
Turning first to the plain meaning of the statute, the court opined
that the term "covered" was understood by patent lawyers to refer
to a "patent containing at least one claim defining a process."' 149
Thus, the plain meaning of the section required a process claim in
143. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
144. 902 F.2d 1532, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1734 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
145. Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1533-35, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1734, 1735-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Amgen's patent was directed toward recombi-
nant DNA sequences, vectors, and host cells used to produce the hormone erythropoietin
(EPO) in its recombinant form, rEPO. Its patent neither claimed the product rEPO nor any
process of making rEPO (nor any other process). Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., a Japanese
company, and its American subsidiary, Chugai Pharma, U.S.A., Inc. were the respondents in
the action before the ITC. Chugai utilized Amgen's host cells to manufacture rEPO, which it
then imported into the United States. Id. at 1533-34, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736.
146. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988). Section 337 of theTariff Act of 1930 is codified
as 19 U.S.C. § 1337, but continues to be referred to by its traditional name. Amgen, 902 F.2d
at 1534, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736.
147. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1537-38, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
148. See id. at 1535-37, 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739, 1741 (rejecting Commission's and
intervenors' argument that appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
but agreeing with administrative law judge's determination, and ordering dismissal on
merits).
149. Id. at 1538, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
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order for section 337(a)(1)(B) (ii) to apply. Next, the court reviewed
the legislative history of both the original provision containing sec-
tion 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) and the 1988 revisions to section 337, which
did not change the key language of that statute. Nothing in either
history convinced the court that Congress expressed a clear legisla-
tive intent contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.1 50 Thus,
Amgen's patent did not cover the imported rEPO, and the court
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it on the merits.' 5 '
The court observed that Congress did not appear to consider the
loophole in section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii), exploited by Chugai in this
case, during its 1988 revisions to the statute. However, it declined
an invitation to alter the plain meaning. 152 Since Congress has yet
to alter the statute, the loophole still exists, and will continue to be
exploited. Congress' inability to act may reflect a consensus that
closing the loophole is undesirable. In any event, now that In re
Durden 15 3 has been clarified somewhat, the problem may be solved




The Federal Circuit showed no compunction about levying signif-
icant fines and increased costs against parties and attorneys who
crossed the threshold of vigorous advocacy into the realm of appeals
the court deemed frivolous. The court issued a number of opinions
which sanctioned a party, its counsel, or both for bringing an ap-
peal. In most instances, the court awarded the opposing party its
attorneys' fees and double costs of the appeal, while in one case the
appellant's attorney was held jointly and severally liable for the
sanction.
150. See id. at 1539-41, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738-40 (reviewing legislative history of section
1337(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
151. Id. at 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741. The International Trade Commission dismissed
the action on jurisdictional grounds. The Federal Circuit held that the Commission should
have addressed the merits, and not dismissed the action on the jurisdiction question. Id. at
1536, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1737-38.
152. Id. at 1540, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741. The court reasoned that "[i]f there is a need to
alter the understanding of the expression 'process covered by the claims,' which has persisted
unchanged for nearly half a century, in order to take care of Amgen's problem, it is a task for
Congress, which can explore its impact and side effects, and not for this court."
153. See infra notes 267, 276-77 and accompanying text (discussing Durden).
154. See Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534 n.1, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1736 n.I (discussing prosecution
of rEPO patent). The court noted that Amgen's original application contained claims cover-
ing the process of producing rEPO, but those were rejected, at least in part, because the
examiner believed them to be unpatentable under the rule of In re Durden. Id. According to
the court, the examiner actually went much further in his rejection, stating his belief that any
similar claim would be unpatentable under Durden as the Patent and Trademark Office was
then reading that opinion. Id.
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In Pac-Tec, Inc. v. Amerace Corp. ,155 the court considered appellant's
counsel's behavior particularly egregious and held him jointly and
severally liable for costs. The court held every argument raised in
the appeal frivolous. In one of the most biting opinions ever issued
by the Federal Circuit, then Chief Judge Markey wrote:
The appeal itself is frivolous, and its frivolity is unrelieved by even
one of counsel's many arguments. Beyond frivolity, however, the
conduct of counsel in this litigation infects the judicial process
with a disabling disease of deceit that the courts must act to ex-
punge, for if courts remain passive, that disease will spread until it
destroys a judicial process and a legal profession no longer worth
preserving.15 6
The sanction imposed in Pac-Tec came as no surprise, after what
the court described as a "singularly sanctionable sojourn among the
hallowed halls of justice."'157 In fact, Pac-Tec and its counsel had
already been sanctioned three times, by three courts, during the liti-
gation. 158 As a sanction for what it considered an "utterly meritless
appeal," the court awarded Amerace its attorneys' fees and double
costs, and held Pac-Tec's counsel jointly and severally liable for the
sanctions. 159
One day after Pac-Tec, the court issued its opinion in Eltech Systems
Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc. ,160 and again sanctioned the appellant for
a frivolous appeal, awarding PPG its attorneys' fees and double
costs. Eltech is more troublesome than Pac-Tec, however, because
the court's discussion of the issues, while highly critical, was
substantive.'
6 '
On appeal, Eltech raised issues regarding claim interpretation, in-
fringement and whether the case was exceptional. The court af-
firmed the trial court's findings regarding infringement and claim
interpretation, and found Eltech's appeal of these issues frivolous.
The court agreed that the case was exceptional under section 284,
but did not find Eltech's appeal of this issue frivolous.162 Nonethe-
155. 903 F.2d 796, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
156. Pac-Tec, Inc. v. Amerace Corp., 903 F.2d 796, 800, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1871, 1875 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). It is perhaps a coincidence, but worthy of note, that all of the published patent
cases that imposed sanctions were authored by Judge Markey.
157. Id.
158. See id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874 (citing district court's Rule I 1 sanction of counsel); In
re Pac-Tec, Inc., Misc. No. 260 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 1989) (denying petition for rehearing and
imposing sanctions for filing frivolous petition for writ of mandamus); In re Pac-Tec, Inc., 891
F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1989) (imposing sanction for filing frivolous petition for writ of mandamus)
(cited in 903 F.2d at 800, 121 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1874).
159. Pac-Tec, 903 F.2d at 804-05, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1879.
160. 903 F.2d 805 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
161. Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 808-11 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
162. Id. at 809-12.
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less, the court concluded that the case was "another in what appears
to be a gradually increasing number of frivolous appeals to th[e]
Court."1 6 3 The court praised the trial judge's "excellent and thor-
ough" opinion and his "clearly correct findings and.., flawless ap-
plication of the law to those findings,"'r and concluded that Eltech
"based its appeal on baseless arguments and an attempt to retry its
case, employing baseless arguments and misstatements of the rec-
ord."1 65 Thus, it determined that sanctions were appropriate.
Eltech is noteworthy because it represents the court's, and Judge
Markey's, resolve to follow through on its earlier warnings that par-
ties whose appeals constituted a retrial of their case would be sanc-
tioned. It now appears that the court will hold parties to a very high
standard when judging whether an appeal is frivolous. That stan-
dard seems to require more than an assertion of mere apparent er-
ror in the record or the trial court's opinion. 166
The court also imposed sanctions in Refac International, Ltd. v.
Hitachi, Ltd. 167 Refac appealed from a dismissal entered as a Rule 37
sanction after Refac failed to respond adequately to defendants' dis-
covery requests, despite being ordered to do so. 168 Citing Ninth
Circuit precedent, Refac argued on appeal, inter alia, that the court's
failure to warn that dismissal was a possible sanction was errone-
ous. 169 Although the court distinguished this precedent, it was less
than clear that Refac's attempt to bring itself within the bounds of
163. Id.
164. Id at 811.
165. Id.
166. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik, GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d
1403, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding absence of frivolity but intimating that
low threshold would apply). ChiefJudge Markey remarked:
To list each of the many statements in Lindemann's brief that are either unsup-
ported or contradicted by the record would unduly lengthen this opinion. With
those statements, Lindemann is arguing a different case from that presented at the
trial level. That Lindemann found such statements necessary should have told it that
there were no proper grounds for reversal and that in filing this appeal it was walking
on the razor's edge of frivolity.
Id. at 1405-06, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1873; see also id. at 1406 n.1, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1873 n.l
(commenting that "[a]bout half of the practice of a decent lawyer is telling would-be clients
that they are damned fools and should stop") (quoting Elihu Root in McCordless v. Great Atd.
& Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 201-02 (7th Cir. 1983)).
167. 921 F.2d 1247, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
168. Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1347, 1350-51 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (discussing procedural history of litigation); see FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (authorizing
sanctions upon party failing to obey an order to persuade or permit discovery). The district
court's orders were made on the basis of a magistrate's findings. RefacInt'l, 921 F.2d at 1251,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351.
169. Id. at 1354 (distinguishing United States v. National Med. Enters. Inc., 792 F.2d 905,
910 (9th Cir. 1986) on grounds that warning for dismissal was taken pursuant to court's inher-
ent powers, not Rule 37(b)). It was stipulated that Ninth Circuit precedent applied to the suit
brought originally in California. Id. at 1352; see Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co.,
744 F.2d 1564, 1575, 223 U.S.P.Q. 465,474 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding where procedural ques-
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those cases was frivolous. In addition, Federal Circuit precedent
holds that a warning may be necessary before the sanction of dismis-
sal is levied. 170 It becomes more difficult, therefore, to see the frivo-
lous nature of this appeal. What the court is saying, in essence, is
that Refac should have simply accepted the dismissal.
Finally, in Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co.,171 the court,
rather than sanctioning the parties, chose to fine the attorneys who
signed the respective briefs $1,000 each for which they were person-
ally liable. 172 In Laitram, the parties appealed a summary judgment
decision which the court concluded raised serious questions regard-
ing counsel's representations to the trial court. In particular, the
court cited the parties' continuous references, at the trial court and
at the Federal Circuit, to an exhibit that was not placed before the
district court for its consideration. That exhibit, which was repre-
sented to be the only accused infringing product, was the subject of
deposition testimony. Instead of placing that exhibit in evidence,
the parties placed four other "possibly" infringing exhibits before
the district court. 173 Apparently, these products were not discussed
in the depositions or other supporting evidence at the hearing.
Since no infringing product of record was produced when suit was
brought, the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion. 174 The parties' "irresponsible treatment of the record" on ap-
peal did not allow the court to determine whether "there may have
been in existence a product to which the complaint when filed may
be deemed to have applied."' 75 Thus, the case was remanded to the
district court to determine whether the complaint should be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction.
tion on appeal is not unique to patent law, court applies law of circuit from which case is
appealed).
170. See Ingalls Shipbuilding v. United States, 857 F.2d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (re-
quiring adequate warning before imposing sanction under FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
171. 919 F.2d 1581, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1924 (Fed Cir. 1990).
172. Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1581, 1587, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
1924, 1933 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The conduct for which counsel was fined concerned perceived
abuse of the judicial process of the appellate court. First, the parties "filed briefs so replete
with cross-charges of misstatements and so lacking in record references as to frustrate the
desire of the court to trust its officers in this case." Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933. The court
rejected those briefs in an order listing the improprieties, and required substitute briefs "in
lieu of... imposing appropriate sanctions." Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933-34. The substitute
briefs were judged equally deficient: "Far from aiding this court to decide, by presenting legal
arguments on concrete fact patterns, counsel have in this case wasted this court's resources by
playing in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society." Id. Thus, because counsel's actions
had "unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings," the court decided to assess
fines under its inherent power to discourage such conduct. Id.
173. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933.
174. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1932-33.
175. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933.
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Laitram, similar to the court's other 1990 sanctions cases, indi-
cates an increasing willingness on the court's part to assess mone-
tary disincentives to discourage abuses of the appellate system and
process. 76 If the grounds for the sanctions are not made clear,
however, such decisions can stifle creative advocacy and zealous
representation. While some of these cases represent blatant abuses
or misuses of the litigation and appellate processes, the court has
ventured into murky waters with decisions sanctioning parties for
their failure to realize that their appeal does not stand a chance.
The Federal Circuit countered somewhat the trend toward sanc-
tions by offering some procedural protection to those who may be
subjected to judicial sanctions. In Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England
Printing and Lithographing Co.,1 77 the court held that due process re-
quired a predecision hearing before a trial court could properly as-
sess sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.178 The court considered
whether the trial court's decision to assess sanctions against New
England's attorneys without providing notice and an opportunity to
be heard violated due process where counsel "multipl[ied] the pro-
ceedings unnecessarily and vexatiously" by filing four "weighty"
pretrial motions. 179 The court decided that it did, and remanded
for a hearing on the matter. °8 0 After identifying the difficulties
posed by such an award, the court noted that the availability of a
Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration was inadequate to satisfy due
process.' 8 1
Beatrice Foods suggests that the Federal Circuit will weigh trial
court decisions to sanction parties and their attorneys against high
standards of due process. Interestingly, the court does not seem to
apply the same high standards to its own sanctioning activities.
Although Beatrice Foods considered 28 U.S.C. § 1927, sanctions
under other rules or statutes should be similarly limited to situa-
tions in which the party or counsel had an opportunity to be heard.
Nonetheless, as shown above, the court often levies frivolousness
176. See In re Convertible Rowing Exercise Patent Litig., Misc. No. 258 (Fed. Cir. May 11,
1990) (dismissing, as frivolous, petitions for reconsideration of court's earlier order denying
petition for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(6), which states that grant
of appeal by court of appeals is discretionary). Nonetheless, no monetary sanctions were im-
posed. Id.
177. 899 F.2d 1171, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
178. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171,
1176-77, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
179. Id. at 1177, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025.
180. Id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025.
181. Id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025 (acknowledging that while appellant could have moved for
hearing under FED. R. Civ P. 59(e), "[r]econsideration after a decision has been made is not a
substitute for pre-decision hearing, when such a hearing is otherwise required").
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fines and penalties without providing meaningful notice and an op-
portunity to be heard. At best the matter is generally raised by the
court at oral argument, along with other issues raised in an appeal.
VIII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In Chew v. California,'8 2 the Federal Circuit was faced with deter-
mining whether the eleventh amendment shielded states from pat-
ent infringement suits. 18 3 Chew sued the state of California for
infringement of her patent directed toward a method for testing au-
tomobile exhaust emissions. The district court dismissed the suit,
rejecting Chew's arguments that the state waived its immunity or
impliedly consented to her suit, or that Congress abrogated the
states' eleventh amendment immunity by giving exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such suits to the federal courts.18 4 On appeal, Chew urged
only the last argument.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Chew's assertions and af-
firmed the dismissal. First, the court addressed Chew's argument
that Congress has constitutional power to subject the states to pat-
ent infringement suits, and that Congress accomplished this
through the patent statute.185 The court, however, avoided the con-
stitutional issue. Without deciding whether Congress actually has
the power to subject states to patent infringement, the court con-
cluded that even if Congress possessed such power, the patent stat-
ute contains no explicit statement of congressional intent to
exercise it.186
Congressional intent to abrogate states' immunity recently re-
ceived much attention in the Supreme Court and in the appellate
courts. 187 Even under the Supreme Court's broadest view, the Fed-
182. 893 F.2d 331, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
183. Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 333, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1393, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
184. Id- at 333, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1394. The court rejected Chew's argument explaining
that Congress must be explicit in its intent to abrogate states' immunity under the eleventh
amendment. Id.
185. Id. at 333-34, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1394-95 (stating that state immunity from lawsuits in
federal courts may be limited by delegation of powers to Congress in article I). Article I,
section 8 reads in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power To ... promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
186. Chew, at 334, 13 U.S.P.Q2d at 1395 (noting congressional intent must be "unequivo-
cal" and "textual").
187. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (deciding Education of the Handi-
capped Act did not authorize suit against states); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2821 (1989) (affirming that Bankruptcy Act did not abrogate
eleventh amendment immunity); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding
that Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
abrogated states' immunity because definition of "person" specifically includes states); BV
Engineering v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394, 1395, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1421, 1422 (9th Cir. 1988) (hold-
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eral Circuit noted, Congress must make its intent to circumscribe
states' immunity "unmistakably clear."' 88 Evidence of congres-
sional intent to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity
must be both "unequivocal and textual."' 8 9
Applying this analysis, the court concluded that the patent statute
does not expressly define "whoever" as that term is used in section
271.190 The court rejected Chew's invitation to find abrogation
based on nontextual grounds, such as the public policy behind
granting patents, the exclusivity of Congress' patent power, and the
exclusivity of federal court jurisdiction over patent cases. 191 With-
out specific textual support for abrogating the eleventh amend-
ment's immunity, the court declined to allow the suit to proceed.
The Federal Circuit considered the situation before it identical to
that in BVEngineering v. UCLA4, 192 where the Ninth Circuit held that
Congress did not abrogate states' immunity by enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1976.193 Both plaintiffs failed to persuade the re-
spective courts that the lack of any forum in which to sue a state for
infringement should alter the result. 194
Shortly after Chew, a Florida district court, apparently unaware of
the Federal Circuit's decision, dismissed a Florida resident's patent
infringement suit against the Florida Department of Transportation,
concluding that the state was immune from suit for patent infringe-
ment in federal court under the eleventh amendment. 95 On ap-
ing that Copyright Act of 1976 did not abrogate states' immunity for infringement suits), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989).
188. Chew, 893 F.2d at 335, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1396 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
189. Id. at 334, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989)).
190. Id. at 335, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1396. The court contrasted the unclear patent statute
with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) which abrogated the states' eleventh amendment immunity by explicitly including states
within the definition of persons covered by the Act. Id.
191. Id.
192. 858 F.2d 1394, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989).
193. Id. at 336, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1397.
194. See BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394, 1400, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that Congress had not abrogated the states' immunity by enacting the Copy-
right Act of 1976), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). Cf. Chew, 893 F.2d at 336 n.5, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1397 n.5 (recounting court's disagreement with Ninth Circuit's concern in BV
Eng'g that plaintiffs in such suits would have no forum for recovery). Instead, the court inter-
preted its decision as foreclosing "one avenue of recourse-the specific relief for infringe-
ment of patent rights otherwise provided by federal statute." Id. The court rejected
plaintiff's takings claim because the proper party to such a claim is the United States. Id at
336. However, the court left unanswered whether plaintiffs such as Chew might have a cogni-
zable takings claim if the suit were properly brought. Id. Chew had argued that the failure to
abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement suits necessarily resulted in a deprivation
of property without due process. Id.
195. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., No. 89-411-CIV-T-13B, slip op.
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1990).
PATENT LAW: 1990 SUMMARY
peal, the Federal Circuit, in Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida
Department of Transportation,'96 rejected a proposed distinction be-
tween Chew and that case on the basis of the plaintiff's residence.
Relying on two Supreme Court cases, 197 the court held that elev-
enth amendment immunity bars suit by a resident or nonresident
against a state in federal court for patent infringement. 198 The
court also rejectedJacobs' argument that the suit should be permit-
ted to go forward in order to obtain only a declaration of validity
and infringement, and not damages, because that argument was es-
sentially the same raised and rejected in Chew.' 99
TheJacobs panel, in dicta, went beyond Chew in outlining its belief
that its' decision did not block all avenues of relief for the plaintiff-
patentee against the state. The court stated that "Jacobs could have
sought relief in the Florida legislature through a claims bill .... [or]
assert[ed] a 'takings' claim against the state under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. ' 20 0 The court also noted that, while a
state court is powerless to invalidate an issued patent, "there is no
limitation on the ability of a state court to decide the question of
validity when properly raised in a state court proceeding." 20 ' Thus,
the rule of Chew was applied to block all patent suits against states in
federal court by United States citizens.
Following the decisions in Chew and BV Engineering, several bills
were introduced in Congress to reverse the oversight brought to
light by those cases. On September 12, 1990, Representative Kas-
tenmeier introduced H.R. 5598, which would clarify remedies under
the patent statute.20 2 Title III of that bill proposed to amend 35
U.S.C. § 271 by adding a new section, which would define "who-
ever" to include "any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any
officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in
the official capacity of such officer or employee." 20 3 The bill also
196. No. 90-1251 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 1990).
197. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472, 479-88
(1987) (stating eleventh amendment bars suit against state by both citizens and noncitizens);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (holding citizens of another state may not sue state).
198. SeeJacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., No. 90-1251, slip op. at 3, 6
(holding that eleventh amendment immunity bars suit by resident or non-resident absent
waiver of Congress' abrogation of immunity).
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id at 5.
201. l
202. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1990) (stating that any state shall be subject
to patent statute in same manner as non-governmental entity); H.R. 3886, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., § 2, 136 CONG. REC. H7499 (Sept. 12, 1990) (defining "whoever" to include any state);
S. 2193, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 296, 136 CONG. REC. S1757 (Feb. 27, 1990) (adding section
which specifically says that states are not immune from suit for patent infringement).
203. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1990). Moreover, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1988)
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proposed adding a new section 296 to Title 35 which would explic-
itly abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity of states, their in-
strumentalities, or officers or employees of states and
instrumentalities, thus making them subject to suit for patent in-
fringement. 2°4 Interestingly, the bill also sought to apply section
284's treble damages and section 285's attorney fees provisions to
suits against states, as well as section 289's remedy for design patent
infringement. 20 5 Thus, the bill attempted to correct the omission
discussed in Chew and more. Unfortunately, the bill was not en-
acted, and the bill's chief sponsor was defeated in the 1990 congres-
sional election.
IX. VENUE
Plaintiffs now possess significantly greater choices regarding
where to bring a claim for patent infringement as a result of the
1988 amendments to the general venue statute and the Federal Cir-
cuit's recent opinion in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co. 206 A number of conflicting district court opinions interpreting
the 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) gave the Federal Cir-
cuit's construction of the patent venue statute special importance. 20 7
Prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in VE Holding, the Supreme
Court, in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. ,208 held that sec-
tion 1400(b) was the exclusive provision governing venue in patent
infringement actions; it could not be supplemented or altered by
other statutes absent amendment.20 9 Fourco Glass argued that sec-
tion 1391 (c) defined venue as it should be applied to corporations in
provides, in relevant part, that "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer."
204. Id.
205. H.R. 5598, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3-2 (1990).
206. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
207. Section 1391(c) of Title 28 provides:
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be
deemed to reside in anyjudicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction
at the time the action is commenced. In a state which has more than one judicial
district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdic-
tion at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside
in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it
to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and if there is no such
district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has
the most significant contacts.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
208. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). In Fourco Glass, as in V.E. Holding, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether section 1400(b) was supplemented by section 1391 (c), so that the
term "resides" would have the same meaning in both statutes.
209. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957); see Geriak,
Fifteen Years of Fourco: The Needless Disputes Over Patent Venue, 24 HASINGS LJ. 55, 55-56 (1972)
(arguing that had history of patent venue statute been properly analyzed, Fourco Court would
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all federal question cases including patent cases. However, the stat-
ute provided no language or history indicating an explicit intent to
apply section 1391(c) to section 1400(b). After concluding that sec-
tion 1400(b) was intended to be the exclusive patent venue provi-
sion, and that the general language of one statute does not apply to
a matter specifically dealt with in another statute, the Court refused
to read sections 1391(c) and 1400(b) together.210 Fourco Glass' nar-
row construction of the patent venue statute froze section 1400(b)
and prevented liberalization of patent venue along with most other
venue provisions.
While courts struggled to distinguish Fourco Glass after the 1988
amendments, 2 11 it was not until the Federal Circuit's decision in
V.E. Holding that plaintiffs were freed of the restrictive effect of this
1957 decision. Fourco Glass' construction caused significant collat-
eral litigation and drew heated criticism from commentators who ar-
gued there should be a single venue statute for all federal question
cases. 21
2
In V.E. Holding Corp., the Federal Circuit held that, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) supplements section 1400(b) of the patent
venue statute and changes the meaning of the term "resides." 21 3
The court held that under amended section 1391 (c), a corporate de-
have reached opposite result and permitted section 1400(b) to be supplemented by section
1391(c) which defined term "resided").
210. See Fourco Glass, 353 U.S. at 228 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), as sole and exclusive
provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, "not to be supplemented by the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)").
211. See Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 708 (1972) (apply-
ing section 1391(c) to section 1400(b) in patent suit involving foreign corporations); Pure Oil
Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 207 (1966) (holding that section 1391(c) changed operative
meaning of venue to include place of doing business as residence of corporate defendant and
distinguishing Fourco on ground that patent venue statute was enacted to promote narrow
venue).
212. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3823
(3d ed. 1986) (arguing that statute ought to be repealed, and patent cases treated in same
fashion as federal question cases); see generally Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25
STAN. L. REV. 551 (1973) (arguing that Congress should repeal patent venue statute leaving
general venue laws to govern); Study of the Division ofJurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts,
A.L.I. 221 (1969) (containing simplified version of general venue statute and deleting patent
venue statue entirely). In fact, a 1968 study on jurisdiction by the American Law Institute,
stated:
Any venue statute that produces a large volume of litigation on where suit may be
brought is inherently suspect .... Though a broadening of venue choices increases
the opportunities for forum shopping, an activity not unknown in patent cases, this is
not too high a price to pay for having a single venue rule for federal question cases,
and for putting an end to wasteful litigation about proper venue.
Id.
213. V.E. Holding Corp. v.Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1614 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (holding "that Congress by its 1988 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 1391(c) meant what
is said; the meaning of the term 'resides' in § 1400(b) has changed"), cert. denied, I I I S. Ct.
1315 (1991).
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fendant is deemed to "reside" in any judicial district where it is sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction. 214 So long as personal jurisdiction can
be exercised over the defendant, venue will be proper under section
1400(b). VE. Holding thus resolves a split among the district
courts 2 15 and brings the patent venue statute into conformity with
venue law generally.
The Fourco Glass interpretation of section 1400(b) became vulner-
able in 1988, after Congress amended section 1391(c). 216 Section
1391(c), as amended in 1988, provides in pertinent part: "For the
purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject
to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 21 7
Thus, under section 1391(c), venue lies if personal jurisdiction can
be exercised over the defendant.
VE. Holding resolved the controversy over whether the amended
version of section 1391(c) changed the definition of "resides" in
section 1400(b). 218 Unlike the version of section 1391(c) inter-
preted in Fourco Glass, the 1988 amendment added explicit language
as to the scope of that section. The use of the phrase, "under this
chapter," resolved all doubt as to Congress' intent when it amended
the statute.21 9 Inasmuch as section 1400(b) is part of Chapter 87, a
214. Id. The court's decision addressed the first test in section 1400(b), which allows suit
to be brought in the forum where the defendant "resides." Id. at 1621. Section 1400(b)
provides: "any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1989).
215. Compare Doelcher Prod., Inc. v. HydroFoil, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 666, 672, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1067, 1069 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that section 1400(b) is unchanged by section
1391(c));Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219, 1226, 14 U.S.P.Q2d 1223,
1225 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that section 1400(b) is unchanged by section 1391(c)); with
University of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1909, 1911 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that
section 1391(c) changes section 1400(b); Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 733 F.
Supp. 1170, 1173, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715, 1718 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that section 1391(c)
changes section 1400(b)).
216. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' split on whether
section 1391(c) changes meaning of section 1400(b)).
217. 28 U.S.C. 1391(c) (1988). The commentary on the 1988 amendment remarked that
subdivision (c) now provides that the corporation is to be deemed a resident of any judicial
district in which "it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1391, commentary at 4 (West Supp. 1990). Thus, anything that would make
the corporation amenable to personal jurisdiction in that district, or permit extraterritorial
service of the court's summons under any of several well known tests, would ipso facto make
that district proper as to venue as well. Id.
218. V.E. Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 16 U.S.P.O,2d
1614 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991). At the time the Fourco Glass court
addressed this issue, section 1391(c) provided: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial
district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948).
219. .E. Holding, 917 F.2d 1574, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1614. The "chapter" addressed is
Chapter 87 of Title 28.
1991] PATENT LAW: 1990 SUMMARY 1191
dispute arose as to whether Congress intended the amended version
of section 1391(c) to be read together with section 1400(b), or
whether the statutes should continue to be read separately.
Although section 1391(c) appears clear on its face, the absence of
legislative history indicating a congressional intent to repeal or at
least modify section 1400(b) 220 resulted in a conflict between the
district courts as to whether section 1391(c) was meant to be read
together with, or as a supplement to, section 1400(b). The courts
which addressed this issue were evenly split.
Two district courts rejected the proposition that the statutes must
be read together.2 21 Noting an absence of authority for such a prop-
osition, the trial courts followed the restrictive holding of Fourco
Glass, emphasizing that section 1400(b) was a special exception to
the general venue statute which was exclusively applied in patent
infringement cases.2 22 The district courts were unwilling to apply
amended section 1391(c) to section 1400(b) absent explicit refer-
ence to section 1400(b) in the statute or "unmistakable" legislative
intent.2 s At the same time, two other district courts held that sec-
tion 1391(c) was clear on its face and should be applied as
written.22
4
The Federal Circuit, after carefully reviewing the history of the
patent venue statute as it evolved over the last century, and the lack
of express legislative history indicating that the 1988 amendment of
section 1391(c) was intended to change the scope of section
1400(b),225 acknowledged that one familiar with this history could
220. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 982, 6031 (discussing impact of section 1391 (c) on corporate venue but nothing
else).
221. See Doelcher Prods., Inc. v. Hydrofoil, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 666, 672, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d
1067, 1069 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that section 1391(c) does not alter section 1400(b));Joslyn
Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219, 1226, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1223, 1225 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (stating that section 1391(c) and section 1400(b) are not read together).
222. Doekhler, 735 F. Supp. at 672, 14 U.S.P.O.2d at 1069;Joslyn, 729 F. Supp. at 1226, 14
U.S.P.O.2d at 1225.
223. Id. The language of the statute unequivocally states that for purposes of venue
under Chapter 87, which is part of Title 28, the definition of "resides" in amended section
1391(c) will apply. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c), 1400(b) (1988). Both section 1391(c) and section
1400(b) are part of Chapter 87 which can be found in Title 28. Id. Thus, only an extremely
narrow reading of the new language enabled the lower courts to find that there was no clear
language in amended section 1391 (c) indicating that the term "resides" should be applied to
section 1400(b).
224. University of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 734 F. Supp. 911,913, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1909, 1911
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (reading section 1391(c) in conjunction with section 1400(b)); Century
Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715, 1718 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding
first clause of section 1400(b) is given new meaning by section 1391(c)'s definition of
residency).
225. V.E. Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1577, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1616-17 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the lack of express legislative history
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be tempted to disregard the express language of section 1391(c).226
The court resisted that temptation, stressing that the phrase "this
chapter" in section 1391(c) referred to all of Chapter 87 and there-
fore included section 1400(b) in its application. The court held that
"[o]n its face, § 1391(c) clearly applies to § 1400(b), and thus rede-
fines the meaning of the term 'resides' in that section. 22 7 Thus, the
court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute necessitated
reading sections 1391(c) and 1400(b) together. After an exhaustive
discussion of statutory interpretation, the court explained that
where, as with section 1391(c), the language of the statute is clear,
the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive. 22 8 The court pointed
out the absurd lengths Congress would have to go to if the plain
meaning of the statute was not regarded as conclusive:
We now have exact and classic language of incorporation: "For
purposes of venue under this chapter .... ." Congress could read-
ily have added "except for section 1400(b)," if that exception,
which we can presume was well known to the Congress, was in-
tended to be maintained. Certainly it would not be sensible to
require Congress to say, "for the purposes of this chapter, and we
mean everything in this chapter .... " in order to ensure that it has
covered everything in [sic] chapter of the statutes.
229
The court also rejected an application of the general rule that a
specific statute cannot be controlled or nullified by a general statute,
highlighting section 1391(c)'s express reference to all of Chapter
87, including section 1400(b). The fact that the amendment to sec-
tion 1391 (c), the general statute, may have the effect of redefining a
single term of section 1400(b), the specific statute, was insufficient
to alter the result.230 The court noted that even if the general/spe-
cific rule were applicable, the clear intent of section 1391(c) is to
supplement section 1400(b).
23 1
Since Congress is presumed to legislate with knowledge of devel-
"strengthens the temptation" to disregard the clear language of section 1391 (c) and maintain
independence of that section from section 1400(b)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
226. Id.
227. Id.at 1616-17.
228. Id. at 1618.
229. See id. (stating that section 1391(c) reads itself into section 1400(b) by defining sec-
tion 1400(b) rather than conflicting with it).
230. Id. at 1618. The court rejected the contention that such a statutory construction
renders meaningless the second test under section 1400(b). Id. at 1618 n.17. While it was
true that a corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction wherever it committed acts of
infringement and had a regular and established place of business, thus making venue proper
under the first test of section 1400(b), the court noted that section 1400(b) applied to all
defendants, and thus the second test for venue still applied to defendants that are not corpo-
rations. Id. Presumably, the court and Congress were concerned about the disproportionate
impact on individuals that would result from removing the second test completely.
231. Id. at 1618.
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opments of the law in the relevant area, the court determined that
the absence of legislative history did not modify its obligation to
apply the plain meaning of the statute. Adopting the Eastern Dis-
trict of Tennessee's reasoning, the court pointed to the significant,
heated debate that took place, and the extensive amount of time that
the Subcommittee on FederalJurisdiction spent in drafting the 1988
amendment. 23 2 The court concluded that if Congress intended to
exempt section 1400(b) from operation of the amendment, it would
have expressly indicated such an intent.233
The court concluded by reviewing the history of the patent venue
statute and determining that, while the original patent venue statute
was intended to liberalize venue, changes in the general venue stat-
ute make the patent venue statute obsolete.23 4 The court reasoned
that since the patent venue statute was originally enacted to liber-
alize venue, "the freezing of patent venue as a result of Fourco has
made patent venue an anomaly." 23 5
The court's decision in V.E. Holding breathes new life into, and
allows for evenhanded application of, the patent venue statute.
Prior to VE. Holding, alleged infringers could bring a declaratory
judgment action for noninfringement in any jurisdiction that was
proper under the general venue statute.23 6 Because section 1400(b)
applied only to actions alleging patent infringement, alleged infring-
ers have been able to use the statute as both a sword and a shield,
consistently obtaining the home court advantage. Now the playing
field is even.
In support of the narrow construction given to section 1400(b)
prior to VE. Holding, proponents of the statute argued that the tech-
nical nature of patent infringement required that litigation be con-
fined to the district where the alleged infringement occurred.
23 7 It
was further argued that because alleged infringers were usually
small companies, forcing them to litigate in foreign fora would place
an unfair economic burden on them. As one commentator notes,
232. See id. at 1619 (stating that proposed redraft began "as early as December 1985" and
that language had not changed after almost two years of further consideration).
233. Id. at 1619-20.
234. Id. at 1621 (noting that "with the enactment of liberalized general venue laws, the
patent venue statute has long since outlived its original purpose") (quoting Wydick, Venue in
Actions for Patent Infingement, 25 STAN. L. REv. 551, 584-85 (1973)).
235. Id. at 1620.
236. See United States Aluminum Corp. v. Kawneer Co., 694 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1982)
(providing that venue in a declaratory relief action for patent noninfringement is governed by
general venue section 1391(c) and not special patent infringement venue statute).
237. See Bradford Novelty Co. v. Manheim, 156 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (stating that
legislative policy reflects congressional belief that practicality and convenience are best served
when case is prosecuted where alleged infringement occurred).
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neither of these arguments is supported by the statute's legislative
history.23 8 Moreover, limiting venue to the forum most convenient
to the alleged infringer is contrary to recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on personal jurisdiction, the spirit of which apply with
equal force to patent venue. As the Supreme Court explained in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 239 a state generally has an interest in
providing its residents with access to its courts, but
where individuals purposefully derive benefit from their interstate
activities .... it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having
to account in other states for consequences that arise proximately
from such activities; the Due Process Clause may not readily be
wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that
have been voluntarily assumed.2 40
The Federal Circuit's decision in VE. Holding will not work an in-
justice on defendants in patent infringement suits. Rather, where
the plaintiff's choice of forum is truly burdensome and inconve-
nient, the defendant still retains the right to request a change of
venue under section 1404(a).2 41 In the final analysis, V.E. Holding
brings patent venue in line with venue in general and represents an
overdue change.
X. WILLFULNESS
The Federal Circuit considered willfulness in numerous cases this
year, but only two were significant. In Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems
Industrial Products, Inc. ,242 the trial court found that the defendant,
Intersystems, willfully infringed Gustafson's patent, awarded no
damages, but awarded Gustafson attorneys' fees.2 43 The Federal
Circuit summarily rejected all aspects of the appeals except those
related to the issue of willfulness.2 44 On that issue, the court held
that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous and reversed the
award of attorneys' fees, which was based entirely on the willfulness
238. See Wydick, supra note 212, at 564-66 (stating that Congress did not intend declara-
tory judgment actions to be governed by patent venue statutes).
239. 471 U.S. 472 (1985).
240. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 474 (1985).
241. Section 1404(a) of Title 28 provides, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it may have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
242. 897 F.2d 508, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1972 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
243. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 509, 13 U.S.P.Q2d
1972, 1973 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The trial court refused to award damages due to a determina-
tion that Gustafson's only evidence for damages was inadmissible hearsay. Id., 13 U.S.P.Q2d
at 1973-74. The Federal Circuit's opinion summarily upheld the trial court's determination.
Id.
244. See id. at 509-10, 13 U.S.P.O.2d at 1973-74 (stating that court finds no reversible
error in district court's determinations except those based on willful infringement).
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finding.245
Gustafson is interesting because the facts adduced at trial indicated
that Intersystems was unaware of the patents in suit until Gustafson
filed its suit.2 46 After reviewing case law governing situations where
a party manufactured an infringing product before the patent is-
sued, the court concluded that since a party cannot be held liable for
damages resulting from actions taken before a patent issues, the
same rule must apply to willfulness.2 47 Continuing, the court de-
cided that when the trial court finds that an alleged infringer did not
know the patent in suit existed until initiation of the suit, and where
no abuse of the litigation process occurred, it would be anomalous
to allow recovery of increased damages under section 284.248
In Modine Manufacturing Co. v. Allen Group, Inc.,249 another case
where willfulness was raised, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Modine's motion for enhanced damages under sec-
tion 284.250 That denial came even though the jury determined that
the defendant, the Allen Group, willfully infringed Modine's patent.
The court rejected the contention that a willfulness finding required
an award of enhanced damages, stressing instead that the statute
"merely authorizes" such an award in the sound discretion of the trial
court.25' The court was satisfied that the trial judge "carefully con-
sidered the finding of willful infringement in light of the deterrent
function of enhanced damages" in deciding not to increase the
award.25
2
Modine continues the court's trend in favor of upholding carefully
articulated refusals to award increased damages and/or attorneys'
fees, even where a case is exceptional. It also provides a clear indi-
cation that the court will uphold such refusal only if specific and
thorough findings are made to support the district court's discre-
tionary determination not to make these awards.
245. Id. at 511, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1975.
246. Id. at 510, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1974.
247. Id. at 510-11, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1974.
248. Id.
249. 917 F.2d 538, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
250. Modine Mfg. Co. v. The Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622,
1626 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that court will only overturn trial court's ruling on enhanced
damages if abuse of discretion is shown and no such abuse was found in this case).
251. Id. at 543, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1625 (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1626. The court also concluded that there was no error
in the trial judge's decision not to award the plaintiff its attorneys fees, despite finding the
case exceptional under section 285. See id. (stating that all exceptional cases do not necessar-
ily require attorneys' fee awards).
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XI. OBVIOUSNESS: PLEUDDEMANN AND DILLON
The Federal Circuit determined obviousness issues in several
cases. In one case, In re Dillon,253 the court reversed the Patent Of-
fice's decision denying a patent application based on obviousness
grounds.2 54 Instead, the court found that since a prima facie obvi-
ousness case had not been made, the Board could not reject the
patent application. 25 5 In 1989 Judge Newman, joined by Judge
Cowen, held that Diane Dillon's composition claims were not obvi-
ous because the new use discovered by Dillon was neither taught
nor suggested by the prior art even though the components of Dil-
lon's composition were structurally similar to known composi-
tions.256 Almost a year later, on rehearing, the court en banc
affirmed the Board's obviousness rejection. 257 Specifically, the
court affirmed the Board's finding that compositions of a hydrocar-
bon fuel and a tetra-orthoester were prima facie obvious since there
is a "sufficiently close relationship between the tri-orthoesters and
tetra-orthoesters in the fuel oil art to create an expectation that hy-
drocarbon fuel compositions containing the tetra-esters would have
similar properties.V258
Dillon argued that In re Wright 2 59 controlled, and that, under
Wright, the establishment of prima facie obviousness required, 1) the
new composition or compound be structurally similar to the known
composition or compound, and 2) a suggestion or expectation in
the prior art that the new composition or compound would have the
same or similar utility discovered by the applicant. 260 The court
held that the second element of Wright was not the law and, to that
extent, overruled Wright.26' Even though the court rejected the sec-
ond element of Wright, it refused to hold that in all cases involving
chemical compositions, structural obviousness necessarily meant
253. 892 F.2d 1554, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (1989), reh'g granted, 919 F.2d 688, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
254. See In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 1569, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337, 1348 (1989), reh 'g granted,
919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (declaring that Dillon's compositions do
not constitute prima facie obviousness case with regard to prior art); see also id. at 1570, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1350 (stating that method claims do not constitute prima facie obviousness
case). For a discussion regarding the In re Dillon decision prior to the rehearing, see
Chartove, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During
1989, 39 Am. U.L. REv. 1075, 1094-96 (1990).
255. See id. at 1569, 1570, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1348, 1349 (concluding that prior art does not
constitute prima fade obviousness case for either composition claims or method claims).
256. Id. at 1557, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339.
257. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(expressing agreement with Board's primafacie obviousness finding).
258. Id
259. 848 F.2d 1216, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
260. In re Dillon, 892 F.2d 1554, 1560, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
261. In re Dillon, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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composition prima facie obviousness. 262
The court also used In re Papesch263 and In re Durden264 in its analy-
sis. The majority seemed to be the most sensitive to In re Papesch.
The dissent argued that, because the court was utilizing an approach
denounced in Papesch, the court was weakening Papesch's holding.
2 6 5
Because the majority had concluded that Papesch did not deal with
the requirements of a prima facie case, it rejected the dissent's argu-
ment. 26 6 The court cited In re Durden,26 7 claiming it is not authority
to reject as obvious a method claim solely because it reads on a
known type of process. 268
Several months earlier, the court had the opportunity with In re
Pleuddemann269 to interpret Durden. The claims on appeal in PLeud-
demann related to either a process for bonding a polymizable mate-
rial to a filler or to a method for priming a surface in order to
improve its bonding to organic resins. 270 The court rejected these
claims as being obvious over a much older Pleuddemann patent
which disclosed the same bonding process.
271
Before discussing Durden, the court reviewed its 1973 In re
Kueh1272 decision, concerning a novel zeolite catalyst used in a hy-
drocarbon cracking process. 273 The Federal Circuit had allowed
claims directed to the catalyst and to the method of making the cata-
lyst, but rejected claims as to the catalyst's use.274 After applying a
standard obviousness test to the claims directed to the use of a new
catalyst in the hydrocarbon cracking process, the court reversed the
rejection.27
5
With that background, the court proceeded to discuss Durden, re-
262. lId
263. 315 F.2d 381, 137 U.S.P.Q. 43 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
264. 763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
265. Dillon, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1905; see id. at 1902 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that
majority accepts proposition rejected by Papesch which subsequent cases have repeatedly
reinforced).
266. Idt
267. 763 F.2d 1406, 226 U.S.P.Q. 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
268. Dillon, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1905.
269. 910 F.2d 823, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1738 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Judge Rich, who wrote the deci-
sion in Durden, also authored Pleuddemann.
270. In re Pleuddemann, 910 F.2d 823, 824, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1738, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
271. Id at 825, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739. The examiner cited Durden, and the Board, in
affirming, relied additionally on In re Kanter, 399 F.2d 249, 158 U.S.P.Q. 331 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
and In re Neugebauer, 330 F.2d 353, 141 U.S.P.Q. 205 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
272. 475 F.2d 658, 177 U.S.P.Q. 250 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
273. Pleuddeman, 910 F.2d at 826, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740 (citing Kuehl, 475 F.2d 658, 177
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jecting both the Examiner's and the Board's interpretation of it.276
The court stated:
Durden was a case involving only the patentability of a process of
making a novel insecticide and the single claim on appeal was held
to be directed to obvious subject matter in view of a prior art pat-
ent disclosing a very similar process using similar reactants
notwithstanding the facts that there were unobvious starting
materials used and unobvious products obtained.
277
The court also dismissed the relevancy of In re Kanter and In re
Neugebauer, and returned to In re Kuehl because its facts were most
similar to the facts at issue.2 78 The court used Kuehl's reasoning to
determine that Pleuddemann could patent his method of use
claims.2 79 The key to the court's reasoning in Pleuddemann appears
in its statement that "there is a.real difference between a process of
making and a process of using and the cases dealing with one in-
volve different problems from the cases dealing with the other.
'2 0
The court essentially held that because Pleuddemann involved a pro-
cess for using novel silanes, the Board erred in applying Durden, a
process making case, rather than Kuehl, a process using case.
In re Eli Lilly 281 and Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. 282 are also
of some interest. In Eli Lilly, the court reviewed the standard neces-
sary to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness.283 Gillette in-
volved an appeal from a district court decision involving a patent for
postfoaming shaving gel.28 4 The district court found that the shav-
ing gel composition claims were nonobvious. 285 Gillette argued
that the district court committed legal error in applying a "clearly
suggested" test.28 6 Rather than enmeshing itself in this argument,
the Federal Circuit applied its own obviousness analysis to the in-
276. Id. at 827, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741 (stating that court rejected Examiner's and Board's
opinion that Durden is controlling because of distinguishing facts).
277. Id
278. Id
279. Id at 828, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1742 (applying Keuhl's analysis of determining obvi-
ousness through prior art to present case and concluding that Pleuddemann could patent his
claim).
280. Id at 827, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1741.
281. 902 F.2d 943, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
282. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1923 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
283. In re Eli Lilly, 902 F.2d 943, 947, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1741, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating
that courts should, as this court did, apply obviousness standard and review all evidence and
relevant facts). Because the applicant presented rebuttal evidence, the court could review all
the evidence and make an obviousness determination. Id.
284. Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 16 U.S.P.O,2d 1923, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
285. Id. Since obviousness was a question of law, the district court's finding was indepen-
dently reviewable. Id. at 1926.
286. Id. Gillette attempted to read a "clearly suggested" test into Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Johnson &Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 223 U.S.P.Q. 603 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This was rejected by
the court.
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vention as a whole and affirmed the district court's decision because
"the prior art made no suggestion, clear or otherwise, of substituting
the claimed water-soluble polymers" for the prior art's jellifying
agent.287
The best that can be said of the 1990 obviousness decisions is that
the Court will continue to apply a rather strict, literal analysis to its
precedent, thus giving each panel maximum flexibility.
XII. ON SALE
The Federal Circuit continued to address the statutory bar to pat-
entability arising where the "invention was . . . in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application in the United States. ' 288 In Manville Sales Corp. v. Para-
mount Systems, Inc. ,289 Manville, as assignee of a patent for an "Iris
Arm Luminaire Assembly," sued Paramount for infringement of its
patent, the '333 patent. At issue was whether the patentee's use of
the invention more than one year prior to the application date was
experimental.
The '333 patent was conceived in response to the failure of
Manville's luminaire assembly that was installed pursuant to a con-
tract between Manville and the state of Wyoming. In October 1971,
the patented design was installed on a test lamppole at Manville's
research and development center in Ohio. After proving operable
on the test pole, the inventor obtained permission from Wyoming to
test the new design, and installed the device in November 1971, in
place of a previously installed device that had failed, and which was
located in a rest area not yet open to the public.2 90 The drawings
sent to the state included a confidentiality notice, valid under Wyo-
ming law.
After the device survived the winter, Wyoming paid Manville in
April 1972. Meanwhile, Manville offered the new device to other
customers in March 1972, and described the device in the owner's
manual. However, Manville did not file the patent application until
February 5, 1973. Paramount argued that the delay between the in-
stallation in Wyoming and the patent application constituted an on
sale or public use bar to the patent. The district court rejected this
argument and specifically found that "no one could have known at
287. Id at 1927 (emphasis added).
288. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
289. 917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
290. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc. 917 F.2d 544, 548, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587,
1591 (Fed. Cir. 1990). While the state agreed to pay for this device, payment was conditional,
subject to satisfactory performance, after installation. Id.
1991] 1199
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REvIEw[Vol. 40:1157
that time whether the new iris arm would work as intended."' 29 1 The
Federal Circuit, agreeing with the district court, affirmed on the
grounds that the Wyoming activities constituted experimental
use.292 The court's focus was on whether the totality of the circum-
stances comported with the policies behind the on sale and public
use bars. 293 Those policies include whether the use "discourag[ed]
the removal of inventions from the public domain which the public
justifiably [came] to believe [was] freely available, prohibit[ed] an
extension of the period for exploiting the invention, and was in ac-
cord with the statute's favoring prompt and widespread disclosure
of inventions. 2
94
In the court's opinion, Manville's actions did not amount to lead-
ing the public to believe that the invention was in the public domain
because: 1) Manville conveyed the experimental nature of the use
to Wyoming officials; 2) Manville marked the drawings confidential
and could rely on Wyoming law to protect that confidentiality; and
3) the circumstances made it unnecessary for Manville to advise any-
one other than the Wyoming officials in charge of the project that
the use was experimental. 295 The fact that Manville placed the in-
vention atop a 150 foot pole and that it was installed in a closed rest
area made it unnecessary to advise anyone else of its activities.
296
The court also felt that Manville's actions did not evidence an at-
tempt to expand the patent term. First, Manville did not initiate a
sales campaign until after the Wyoming testing was completed and
the results determined. Second, the court viewed Wyoming's pay-
ment as a sale "primarily for experimental purposes. "297 Third,
Manville did not attempt to use or sell the invention until after it was
tested in the environment in which it was meant to operate. Finally,
Manville's actions were consistent with the prompt and widespread
disclosure of inventions. 298 Because there could be "no basis for
confidence by the inventor that the invention would perform as in-
tended" 299 until it had been tested in the Wyoming winter environ-
ment, and because once the tests were successful, Manville moved
291. Id
292. Id at 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1592.
293. Id. at 549, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1591 (stating that court must determine whether "the
totality of circumstances comports with the policies underlying the on sale and public use
bars").
294. Id. at 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1591 (quoting King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.,
767 F.2d 853, 226 U.S.P.Q. 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
295. Id. at 550-51, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1591-92.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1592.
298. Id
299. Id. at 550, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1592.
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promptly to disclose the invention, Manville's actions did not evi-
dence an intent to thwart prompt disclosure.300
The Manville opinion represents the continuing fluidity of the on
sale/public use doctrine. Even more importantly, the case repre-
sents the fact-specific, totality nature of the approach the court has
favored over the last few years. In the Manville case, application of
an ironclad rule regarding uncontrollable circumstances, that is,
anyone could have come to look at the invention, would yield the
opposite result. Instead, the court, like the trial court, reviewed the
whole situation and concluded that Manville took affirmative steps
to protect the invention while at the same time accomplishing the
goal of field testing its product to ensure its viability.
Manville also represents a victory for the notion that actual tests in
the environment in which a product is intended for use can occur
without violating the on sale or public use bar. This represents a
practical application of the rule. If the court had held that con-
trolled field testing constituted a public use or on sale bar, compa-
nies would be forced to file patent applications for potentially
worthless products, thus overburdening an already strained Patent
Office. On the other hand, the opinion does not allow for uncon-
trolled or excessive testing that could easily be sales disguised as
experiments in an effort to subvert the rule.
Application of the totality of the circumstances test used in
Manville led to the opposite result in United States Environmental Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Westall.30 1 In Westall, the patented device was a vacuum-
assisted sludge dewatering system. In 1976, the inventors sold, at
cost, a self-described "experimental" unit to the city of Sunrise,
Florida.30 2 The patentees filed an application in 1976 for a device
with a single filter plate, and a continuation-in-part (CIP) applica-
tion on August 2, 1978 for a device claiming a multiple layer filter
plate.303 The CIP ultimately resulted in the patent. Because the
multiple layer plate was not disclosed in the original application, the
critical date for the on sale analysis was August 2, 1977.304
The district court found that Westall made a prima facie case and
that the patentees failed to bring forward evidence sufficient to re-
but that showing.30 5 The Federal Circuit agreed. USEP produced
300. Id. at 550-51, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1592.
301. 911 F.2d 713, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1898 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
302. United States Env't Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 715, 717, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
1898, 1900, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
303. Id. at 715, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1900.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 716, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1901. The USEP argued that the district court improp-
erly shifted the burden to them. This argument, however, was rejected by the Federal Circuit,
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significant subjective evidence of experimental use, such as specific
statements by the city and the patentees that the system was experi-
mental and that the patentees made no profit on the system sold to
Sunrise. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit concluded on the basis of
objective evidence to the contrary that the system provided to Sun-
rise was a sale. The objective evidence upon which both courts
relied included USEP's lack of control over the invention,306 the
agreement's lack of a provision restricting resale or use, promotion
of the invention during the purportedly "experimental" period and
the absence of a cofidentiality agreement from the city.3 07 As a re-
sult of this objective evidence, the court rejected the subjective evi-
dence, and upheld the district court's determination of invalidity.
The Westall opinion illustrates two important, interrelated points.
First, the Federal Circuit's refusal to overturn the trial court's con-
clusion regarding the on sale issue came despite significant evidence
that the court chose to term "subjective." Some of that evidence
included written records of the negotiations between the patentee
and the purchaser, and therefore could not readily be considered
contrived for litigation. Second, the court allowed the invalidation
of a patent solely on the basis of objective evidence, upholding the
trial court's complete dismissal of the subjective evidence. This rep-
resents an interesting twist in light of the court's deliberate state-
ments that its (and the trial court's) analysis did not shift the burden
of proof on the overall issue of validity.308 Whether or not the bur-
den was shifted, Westall seems to require a high level of proof to
show experimental use, and one that virtually necessitates objective
evidence of experimental use, if any contrary objective evidence is
introduced.
XIII. SECTION 102(g)
The Federal Circuit addressed another important aspect of valid-
which concluded that the district court's references to the USEP's failure to offer sufficient
evidence of experimental use referred to the lack of rebuttal evidence. Id.
306. Id. at 717, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1902. The city of Sunrise maintained complete control
under the offer-to-sell agreement. Id.
307. Id. at 717-18, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1902.
308. Id. at 716, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1901. Interestingly, the court stated that the patentees
did not produce evidence sufficient to support their experimentation position, once the in-
finger made a prima facie showing of on sale. Id. In order to make that prima facie showing,
however, the accused infringer needed to show only that the sale was made before the critical
date. The patentee then rebutted with subjective evidence of experimental use. In response
to that evidence, the accused infringer brought forth objective evidence to the contrary. In
other words, the patentee brought forth subjective evidence sufficient to rebut, but the ac-
cused infringer rebutted that evidence with objective evidence.
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ity in New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp. 3 09 The court reaf-
firmed the rule that section 102(g) is applicable to infringement
suits as well as to interference proceedings.3 1 0 Section 102(g) pro-
vides that a person is entitled to a patent unless "before the appli-
cant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by
another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."311
Despite the more common application of that section to interfer-
ence practice, the court previously recognized its proper application
to infringement actions.31 2 In New Idea, the court found no error
where the jury was presented with the question of whether the pat-
ent in suit was invalid under, inter alia, section 102(g).3 13 The Fed-
eral Circuit rejected New Idea's arguments that the evidence did not
adequately support the jury's factual findings,31 4 and concluded
that, because the jury found that someone other than the patentee
was the first to conceive the invention and to reduce it to practice,
New Idea's patent was invalid. In the court's view, because someone
other than the patentee was the first person to conceive and to re-
duce to practice under section 102(g), "the invention was made in
this country by another... who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it. ' '315 New Idea is noteworthy because it provides a
weapon which is often overlooked in the defendant's arsenal of inva-
lidity defenses.
XIV. BEST MODE
Although the Federal Circuit considered the issue of best mode in
several cases, Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries Corp.316 stands out be-
cause it both reaffirmed principles of the best mode analysis and
clarified very important issues within that analysis. The court ini-
tially reiterated the familiar fact that best mode "focuses on the in-
ventor's state of mind as of the time the application is filed-a
309. 916 F.2d 1561, 16 U.S.P.Q2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
310. New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
1424, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
311. 5 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
312. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434-
37, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1129, 1132-35 (Fed. Cir.) (applying section 102(g) to patent infringement
action), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
313. See New Idea Farm Equip. Corp., 916 F.2d at 1566-67, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1428-29 (af-
firming district court's judgment of invalidity under section 102(g)).
314. Id. at 1566, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1428-29. Thejury was asked a series of interrogatories
that covered the necessary elements to find invalidity under section 102(g). Id. at 1565, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427-28.
315. Id. at 1567, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1429 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (1988)).
316. 913 F.2d 923, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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subjective, factual question."3 17 The Chemcast opinion also dis-
cussed at length the role that level of skill in the art plays in the
analysis.31
8
The Chemcast opinion outlined a two-pronged inquiry governing
the best mode analysis. The first prong is a subjective analysis in
which the court determines whether the inventor knew of a mode of
practicing his or her claimed invention that he or she considered to
be better than any other.31 9 Once the trial court determines that the
inventor in fact contemplated such a preferred mode, in the second
prong, an objective analysis, the court compares what the inventor
knew with what he disclosed. That is, the trial court must ask: "Is
the disclosure adequate to enable one skilled in the art to practice
the best mode or, in other words, has the inventor 'concealed' his
preferred mode from the 'public'?"3 20 Two "objective limitations"
within the second prong require the trial court to review the ade-
quacy of the disclosure in light of the scope of the claimed invention
and the level of skill in the art at the time the disclosure was
made.3 21 While the analysis is "objective," the mythical objective
observer must be one skilled in the art to which the patent is
addressed.3 22
A second "objective limitation" requires the trial court to define
exactly what the claimed invention is and then to weigh the disclo-
sure according to that art.3 23 Thus, the Federal Circuit distin-
guished cases such as Randomex, Inc. v. SCopus Corp.,324 where the
deliberate concealment of information did not violate the best mode
because the invention at issue did not add to or claim to add to the
317. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033, 1035
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
318. Id. But see Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 418, 8 U.S.P.Q2d
1692, 1696 (Fed. Cir.) (implying that "skill in the art" is not relevant to analysis), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1067 (1989). Dana Corp. raised a question as to whether the Federal Circuit had
inadvertently written out of the best mode analysis the relevant skill in the art. Certainly,
Dana Corp. could lead one to that conclusion. Id.
319. Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 928, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036. In the Federal Circuit's words, the
first prong was to determine "whether, at the time the inventor filed his patent application, he
knew of a mode of practicing his claimed invention that he considered to be better than any
other." Id.; see also Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 940-41, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir.) (upholding finding of invalidity where testimony showed
that inventor knew before application was filed that special tape was required to capture data
most efficiently), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).
320. Id. This latter part of the test, assessing the adequacy of the disclosure, "was largely
[an] objective inquiry that depends upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of
skill in the art." Id. at 928, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037.
321. Id. at 926-27, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036.
322. Id at 927, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1036. In the court's words, "the level of skill in the art is a
relevant and necessary consideration in assessing the adequacy of a best mode disclosure."
323. Id
324. 849 F.2d 585, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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prior art in the concealed area.3 25
Chemcast is the court's first clear statement since Spectra-Physics, Inc.
v. Coherent, Inc.,326 that the level of skill in the art is a relevant and
important factor in the best mode analysis.327 Opinions subsequent
to Spectra-Physics had suggested that the court might depart from
these objective criteria and focus almost completely on whether cer-
tain information was placed in the patent by the inventor, whether
or not those disclosures related to collateral matters.3 28 That trend
brought the court dangerously close to requiring unusually large
and detailed disclosures, including disclosures regarding unclaimed
matters.3
29
Fortunately, Chemcast brings the court back in line with earlier pre-
cedent that allows an inventor, in formulating a disclosure, to rely
upon the relevant knowledge of one skilled in the art in order to
understand the disclosure. Thus, one can again consider the rele-
vant level of skill in the art when drafting the specification language
used to describe a section 112, paragraph 1 disclosure. Similarly,
Chemcast reaffirms the notion that a specification need not disclose
everything there is to know about everything in the invention.
Rather, the disclosure should focus on the claimed invention rather
than attempting to provide a discourse on all possibly relevant sub-
ject matter.
XV. INFRINGEMENT
A. Doctrine of Equivalents: Wilson Sporting Goods and the
Hypothetical Claim
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs. 33 0 was one of the
court's more significant decisions on the doctrine of equivalents in
325. See Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036 (distinguishing case from cases
where best mode requirement was not violated).
326. 827 F.2d 1524, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In Spectra-Physics, the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court's determination of the invalidity of two laser patents on the
ground that the patent specifications did not comply with the best made disclosure require-
ment of section 112. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1531, 3
U.S.P.Q2d 1737, 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
327. Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 926, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036.
328. See generally Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Dana
Corp. v. IPC Ltd., 860 F.2d 415, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1692 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
329. See Loral Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., Nos. 89-1551, 89-1606, slip op. at 3-5 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 23, 1990) (holding that best mode is not adequately disclosed where mentioned in
parent application and apparent in reduction to practice, but not mentioned in continuation-
in-part on which patent was issued); Dana, 860 F.2d at 420 (holding that best mode require-
ment is not satisfied where not disclosed in patent specifications), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067
(1989).
330. 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.O.2d 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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1990, and since Pennwalt Corp. v. Dward-Waylard, Inc.531 Unfortu-
nately, Wilson Sporting Goods did little to clarify the continuing confu-
sion regarding the doctrine of equivalents analysis. Moreover, it is
quite likely that the decision will also create further confusion. 332
Wilson Sporting Goods began as a straightforward, consolidated ap-
peal from a decision finding Dunlop guilty of infringing Wilson's
golf ball patent and holding that patent valid and enforceable. 333
After discussing the prior art and certain procedural issues,3 34 the
court turned its attention to the parties' doctrine of equivalents ar-
guments. 33 5 Dunlop, the manufacturer of the accused golf balls, ar-
gued on appeal that there was no real difference between its golf
balls and the prior art balls cited by the trial court.336 In Dunlop's
view, the district court's infringement finding allowed Wilson im-
properly to capture the prior art within its claims. The Federal Cir-
cuit agreed with Dunlop and reversed the trial court's decision.
Rather than applying the now familiar language that the doctrine
of equivalents "expands" or "broadens" the claims, the court set
about "clarifying" the doctrine's analytical methodology.3 3 7 The
Federal Circuit restated the doctrine's effect as expanding the right
to exclude, emphasizing that the claims "remain the same. 338 The
court then queried: "If the doctrine of equivalents does not involve
expanding the claims, why should prior art be a limitation on the
range of equivalents?"3 3 9 The court answered its own question this
way:
The answer is that a patentee should not be able to obtain,
under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he could not
lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims.... Thus,
since prior art always limits what an inventor could have claimed,
331. 833 F.2d 931,4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that in order to
find infringement, each element of claim or its substantial equivalent must be present), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
332. See Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The Hypotheti-
cal Claim Hydra, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.QJ. 262, 264-66 (1990) (arguing that decision ob-
fuscates burdens of proof in infringement and validity analyses).
333. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 678, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1943 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
334. Id. at 678-82, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1943-47.
335. Id. at 683, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1947. The only theory of liability presented at trial was
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 687, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1950. This language was used in numerous earlier opin-
ions, including Intervet Am. v. Kee-Vet Laboratories, 887 F.2d 1050, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1474 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) and Thomas &Betts Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 220 U.S.P.Q 1 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), as well as many others, and is accepted usage both in the bar and before the court.
338. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684, 14 U.S.P.O.2d at 1948.
339. Id- (emphasis in original).
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it limits the range of possible equivalents of a claim.340
The court was simply restating existing doctrine. At this point, the
court would normally determine whether the accused device was en-
compassed by the prior art and whether anything in the prosecution
history further limited the scope of the claims. Instead, "[tlo sim-
plify analysis and bring the issue onto familiar turf," the court intro-
duced the concept of the hypothetical claim.
3 41
The hypothetical claim analysis requires one to "conceptualize
the limitation on the scope of equivalents by visualizing a hypothetical
patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused prod-
uct."'3 42 Once this hypothetical claim is drafted, the relevant consid-
eration is whether that claim could have been allowed by the PTO
over the prior art. If such a claim would not have been allowed, the
patentee may not obtain this coverage, and the prior art bars in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents. But, if the hypotheti-
cal claim would have been allowed, then the prior art is not a bar to
a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
This analysis drastically alters the manner in which the doctrine of
equivalents is applied. In essence, it holds the doctrinal application
up to a mirror. The court recognized this when it noted that "in this
manner [the analysis] allows use of traditional patentability rules
and permits a more precise analysis than determining whether an
accused product . . . would have been obvious in view of the prior
art." 343 Under the hypothetical claim analysis, the patentee now
must provide a claim that, everything else being constant, will in-
clude the accused device, but not the prior art.344 This is opposed
to the former analysis, which required the patentee to show only
entitlement to a range of equivalents broad enough to encompass
the accused device, and required the accused infringer to prove that
the claims, as expanded, would be obvious in view of the prior art.
Although the patentee must, under the hypothetical claims analysis,
establish the validity of proposed hypothetical claims, the patentee
appears to obtain automatically an initial presumption that the
340. Id
341. Id.
342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. Id (emphasis in original).
344. See id. at 685, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1949 (stating that there was "no logical reason why
[the] burden should shift to the accused infringer"). One commentator has been highly criti-
cal of the court's placement of the burden of proof for this analysis on the patentee. See
Parker, supra note 332, at 277 (stating that patentee now has dual burden of proving infringe-
ment and patentability of hypothetical claims). The opinion also left unanswered the material
question ofjust how valid the patentee must prove the claim to be. That is, must the patentee
prove that the hypothetical claim did not fall short of the best mode, enablement, and inven-
tion requirements?
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scope of the claim is at least as broad as the prior art allows. Fortu-
nately, the court makes clear that this analysis precedes the prosecu-
tion history estoppel analysis, and thus the claims may be narrowed
accordingly. The initial presumption, however, is significant.
Rather than clarifying or simplifying the doctrine of equivalents
analysis, Wilson Sporting Goods leaves many unanswered questions,
and may cause confusion, consternation, and speculation as to what
claims would have been allowed. An important unanswered ques-
tion is how many hypothetical claims the patentee must present.
Although one claim should theoretically be sufficient, a problem will
arise when multiple claims could be drafted that would fulfill the
analytical requirements. It is also unclear whether the patentee
must then prove the validity of all these claims. The court places the
burden of proof on the patentee as part of the infringement burden,
but the test may unwittingly shift significant portions of the validity
burden to the patentee. Finally, this new test appears to affect the
scope of all existing claims, since the court concluded that depen-
dent claims could possibly be infringed even though an independent
claim is not infringed. Thus, each dependent claim is subject to its
own hypothetical claim analysis. If the hypothetical claims analysis
is to survive, and not further muddy the already clouded waters of
the doctrine of equivalents analysis, the court has substantial work
ahead.3 4
5
XVI. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
The Federal Circuit considered and decided an interesting nu-
ance within the prosecution history estoppel analysis. InJonsson v.
Stanley Works3 4 6 the court rejected the patentee's argument that cer-
tain limitations and representations made during prosecution were
inapplicable to a continuation-in-part (CIP) application where the
CIP matured into a patent with broad claims not encompassing the
specific limitation in question.
347
Jonsson, the patentee, submitted an application containing claims
reciting an object sensor and an automatic door opening system that
utilized a "diverging beam of radiation".3 48 The PTO rejected the
345. See Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 704, 15
U.S.P.Q2d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Wilson Sporting Goods but determining that "the
hypothetical claim drawn to encompass [the accused device] would not have been unpatent-
able under 35 U.S.C. § 103").
346. 903 F.2d 812, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
347. Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1869 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
348. Id. at 814, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1865.
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application in view of prior art. Jonsson then amended the claim to
include a "diverging beam of diffuse radiation in response to sup-
plied electrical signals."
'3 49
Jonsson submitted arguments with the amendment to distinguish
his invention from the prior art on the basis of the use of the term
"diffuse," which he defined as "moving in many directions. ' 3 5 0 The
claims containing the "diffuse" limitation were made part of the
CIP, and eventually issued as a separate patent. The patent in this
suit, however, issued from a second CIP from the same original ap-
plication, but without any claims incorporating the "diffuse" limita-
tion. The district court held that Jonsson was estopped from
asserting a range of equivalents sufficient to cover Stanley's device
even though Jonsson's later patent was broader and did not contain
the diffuse limitation.
3 51
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that "the prosecu-
tion history of the [earlier] patent and the construction of the term
'diffuse light' contained in that patent, is relevant to an understand-
ing of 'diffuse light' as that term is used in the [later] patent."3 52 As
a result, the district court did not err in relying on the patentee's
remarks made during prosecution of the earlier patent.
TheJonsson opinion represents a logical extension of the prosecu-
tion history estoppel doctrine to include all relevant arguments
made to the PTO, whether or not those arguments are made in a
parent application. Thus, when prosecuting a patent, division of the
application will not shield the patentee from the doctrine's effects.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Insta-Foam Products v. Universal
Foam Systems 353 regarding the doctrine of prosecution history estop-
pel also reached an interesting conclusion. There, the court refused
to estop the patentee Insta-Foam where, following a rejection, it re-
wrote the claim at issue in independent form, but did not comment
upon the merits of the examiner's rejection.3 54 Without such com-
ment, the court stated, "there are no arguments or concessions
which could be a basis for estopping Insta-Foam from obtaining the
recovery it seeks." 355 Thus, the court may not estop a patentee who
made changes to the claims based upon a rejection where no argu-
349. Id. (emphasis in original).
350. Id. at 814, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1865-66.
351. Id. at 816, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1867; see id. at 815, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1866 (stating that
later patent claims are broader).
352. IL
353. 906 F.2d 698, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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ments were made in support of the amendment, except to the extent
reflected by the amendment itself. This portion of Insta-Foam could
present a dilemma during patent prosecution-whether and how
much to argue the distinction of prior art, since it is those very argu-
ments that may be used against the patentee at a later time.
XVII. LACHES AND ESTOPPEL
The Federal Circuit issued two opinions in 1990 regarding the
equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel.3 56 The first of those
opinions, Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc.,3 5 7 considered the issues of
laches and estoppel in the context of a suit seeking to enforce sev-
eral related patents issued over several years. The court rejected
arguments that there could be only one relevant period for deter-
mining laches and estoppel in a case where the three patents the
plaintiff sought to enforce were issued over a six-year period. In-
stead, the court determined that the earliest time at which the laches
period for each patent began to run was the date of the issuance of
the patent since a plaintiff cannot possibly file suit until the patent
issues.35
8
Meyers, the patentee, received three patents for therapeutic sole
structures for running shoes in 1981, 1984, and 1986, respec-
tively.3 59 In 1983, Meyers attempted to license his existing patent to
Brooks, who declined. In 1987, Meyers filed suit against certain re-
tailers selling Brooks' shoes alleging infringement of Meyers' 1981
and 1984 patents. In 1988, Meyers filed suit against Brooks alleging
infringement of all three patents.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Brooks
on the defenses of laches and estoppel. The court determined that
Meyers had unreasonably and inexcusably delayed the suit, and that
silence following his "aggressive assertion" of infringement was so
misleading as to amount to bad faith.3 60
After outlining the tests for laches and estoppel, the Federal Cir-
cuit rejected Meyers' argument that filing suit against the retailers in
356. Although these are separate doctrines, they are usually advanced together, treated in
many of the same opinions, and will be discussed together here.
357. 912 F.2d 1459, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
358. Meyers v. Brooks Shoe, Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 1462, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1055, 1057 (Fed,
Cir. 1990) (considering Meyers' delay in suing for infringement until subsequent patents were
issued found reasonable).
359. li at 1460-61, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1056.
360. lId The district court granted Brooks summary judgment on both the laches and
estoppel defenses. Id at 1461, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1056. The court considered laches to have
run from the time Meyers first learned of the alleged infringement, and the delay in bringing
suit to be unreasonable and inexcusable, amounting to bad faith, and resulting in equitable
estoppel. Id.
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1987 tolled the laches period, noting that Meyers failed to give
Brooks notice of the retailer litigation.A61 The court described such
notice as "necessary if delay is to be excused because of other litiga-
tion. '3 62 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court erred in basing its decision on a single laches period for
all three patents because "Meyers could not have filed suit on his
second patent (the '283 patent) until after it issued in May 1984
[and] he could not have filed suit on his third patent (the '177 pat-
ent) until after it issued in December 1986."363
The court's reasoning hinged upon the related nature of the pat-
ents in suit. Meyers' 1984 patent was a divisional of his 1981 pat-
ent, although the claims were different in scope. When Meyers
learned of Brooks' infringement, in late 1982, his second patent ap-
plication was already pending. The court concluded that
"[a]waiting issuance of the second patent to sue on both at once
conserved both the parties' and the courts' resources." 3 4 The
court declined to adopt an ironclad rule regarding such situations,
but determined that in Meyers' case, the delay was not
unreasonable.3 65
After determining that an independent laches period was re-
quired for each patent, the court concluded that the delays by Mey-
ers were short of six years. The court then concluded that Meyers'
delay was not unreasonable, and that Brooks did not "adequately
show prejudice resulting from the delay."3 6 6 The court also re-
jected Brooks' assertions that it altered its activities during the
laches period due to Meyers' silence. The court found significant
361. See id (considering notice essential for excusal of delay). To successfully establish
the defense of laches, the defendant must show "1) unreasonable and inexcusable delay in
filing suit and 2) material prejudice resulting from the delay." Id. at 1461, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1057 (citingJamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1548, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
1779, 1782 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The equitable estoppel defense was established by showing the
first two elements of the laches defense, and "3) affirmative conduct by the patent owner
inducing the belief that he had abandoned the claims against the alleged infringer and 4)
detrimental reliance by the alleged infringer". Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1057 (citingJamesbury at
1553, 5 U.S.P.Q. at 1756. Laches was presumed if the delay was longer than six years. Id., 16
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1057.
362. Meyers, 912 F.2d at 1461, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1057.
363. Id, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1058. The court noted that the related nature of the patents
and the fact that the second patent was still pending at the time of the first alleged infringe-
ment made the delay reasonable. Id The court considered evidence of Brooks' sales data and
their expenditure of time and money on the accused patented design as inadequate to estab-
lish prejudice for laches purposes. Id
364. Id
365. Id
366. Id. at 1463, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1058. The court found Brooks' sales data and the
assumed incorporation of an accused construction in a number of different shoe models (in-
cluding the expenditure of time and money developing and marketing the new shoe models)
also inadequate to support a summary judgment determination. Id.
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evidence in the record that Brooks, as a rule, ignored outside inven-
tors, and that nothing Meyers did would have caused it to change its
normal course of action.
Even without Brooks' normal course of conduct, the court re-
jected the application of estoppel to this case. The actions that
Brooks argued constituted "aggressive assertion" of the patents
consisted of a telephone call by Meyers in 1983 to Brooks' General
Counsel notifying her of the alleged infringement and an offer to
license. In response to this argument, the court stated: "[W]e do
not believe that a suggestion of infringement coupled with an offer
to license followed by silence will suffice to establish equitable es-
toppel."3 67 The facts provided to the district court were insufficient
to prove that Meyers' silence was intentionally misleading or could
have been perceived as an abandonment of his infringement claim.
Consequently, the decision was reversed and the case remanded for
trial.
Meyers is significant because of the court's treatment of an asser-
tion of related patents. Patentees may now await the issuance of
related patents before asserting existing patents, without fearing a
laches or estoppel pitfall. However, the court was careful to note
that this should not be interpreted as tolling the laches period.
Rather, the salient fact is that the laches period for each patent is
independent. Thus, if an accused device infringed only the earliest
patent, the patentee could still be precluded by laches and/or estop-
pel from recovery. As a result, it is still prudent for the patentee to
sue on the existing patent, and add subsequently obtained patents
at a later date. Further, the patentee can always initiate a new suit
upon issuance of the subsequent patent.
The second case discussing the doctrines of laches and estoppel
was Adelberg Laboratories, Inc. v. Miles, Inc. 368 There, the Federal Cir-
cuit considered, and rejected, an argument by the patentee, Adel-
berg, that laches should not apply where it delayed suit due to a
sublicensing agreement between its licensee and the defendant,
even though Adelberg never knew the terms of or saw the sublicens-
ing agreement. The court recognized the validity of the patentee's
argument, but did not accept its application to the facts before it.36o
Adelberg granted an exclusive license to "use and sell" its inven-
tion to Abbott Laboratories. Adelberg's license with Abbott also
367. Id at 1464, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1058-59.
368. 921 F.2d 1267, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
369. Adelberg Laboratories, Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1267, 1271-72, 17 U.S.P.Q2d
1111, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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provided that Abbott could manufacture the invention only if Adel-
berg failed to fill Abbott's purchase orders. Before receiving that
license, Abbott had entered into an agreement with Cutter Labora-
tories that provided nonexclusive, reciprocal licenses to inventions
that were, inter alia, "owned or controlled by" each other.370
Cutter, a predecessor-in-interest to the defendant Miles, mar-
keted the accused products in 1977. Cutter responded to Abbott's
charge of infringement by claiming that it was entitled to a subli-
cense under the parties' agreement. Adelberg was apparently kept
apprised of these developments, including Cutter's position. Even-
tually, Abbott agreed with Cutter and informed Adelberg of this
conclusion. Adelberg was unaware of the agreement between Ab-
bott and Cutter and did not contact Cutter to indicate that it did not
accept Abbott's conclusion. Between 1978 and 1988, when Adel-
berg filed suit, there was no further claim of infringement by Adel-
berg against Cutter.371 In the meantime, Cutter's sales grew
significantly, and Cutter spent a substantial amount of money to in-
crease production.3
72
Reviewing these facts, the Federal Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment was proper. Adelberg
knew of Cutter's allegedly infringing activities as early as 1977, but
failed to sue until 1988, thus creating a presumption of unreasona-
ble delay.3 73 The court then rejected Adelberg's argument that it
had an excuse for delaying suit. Although the court stated that a
"reasonable belief that Cutter was licensed under the patent" would
be an adequate excuse for Adelberg's delay, it did not accept that
Adelberg had such a reasonable basis to form such a belief.3 74
The exclusive license between Adelberg and Abbott gave Abbott
the right only to use and sell products covered by Adelberg's patent.
In addition, Adelberg did not have access to the agreement between
Abbott and Cutter, and "Adelberg could not reasonably have con-
sidered Cutter to be immunized from suit by being a sublicensee of
370. Id. at 1269, 17 U.S.P.q.2d at 1112. Adelberg was unaware of the agreement between
Abbott and Cutter. Id-
371. Id. Adelberg sued Miles, as successor-in-interest of Cutter, ten years after its last
contact with Cutter. It at 1269 n.1, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112 n.1.
372. Id. at 1269 n.1, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112 n.l. The court estimated that Cutter spent
$60,000 in an effort to increase its production capacity. Id.
373. Id at 1271, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1116-17; seeJamesberry Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods.,
Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1552, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1779, 1785 (Fed. Cir.) (placing burden of demon-
strating absence of genuine issue of material fact on moving party), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828
(1988).
374. Adelberg Laboratories, Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 921 F.2d 1271, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1114.
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Abbott. '375 Finally, the court noted that Adelberg was not paid roy-
alties on the basis of Cutter's sales, as would normally by required
for a sublicense. The court concluded:
If Adelberg truly believed that Cutter was immune from suit be-
cause of its license, but hoped to assert its patent against Cutter in
the future when the sublicense might become ineffective, its posi-
tion here would be much stronger and more credible if it had in-
formed Cutter that it considered Cutter to be an infringer, but for
its sublicense, and that it intended to preserve its right to sue. It
did not do that and it must suffer the consequences of that
inaction.3
76
Thus, Adelberg did not successfully rebut the presumption of un-
reasonable delay.3 77 The court analogized Adelberg's failure to
communicate with situations where the patentee neglects to inform
an accused infringer that its only reason for delaying suit is its in-
volvement in other litigation. The patentee's obligation, according
to the court, is "equally applicable. ' 3 7 8
The court also found all of the elements of estoppel to have been
met independently and thus affirmed the district court's conclusion
on this issue as well.379 The court noted that the presumption appli-
cable in laches from a greater than six-year delay did not apply to
the estoppel analysis. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the district court did not commit error when it determined that
Cutter was materially prejudiced by Adelberg's eleven year delay.
The court agreed that Cutter's continued investment and sales re-
sulting from an assumption that it would not be subjected to suit
375. Adelberg's failure to receive royalties from Cutter's sales further evinced unreasona-
bleness. Id at 1271, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1114.
376. Id. at 1271-72, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1114. Unlike the lower court, the Federal Circuit
believed that a reasonable belief may have justified delay. Id. at 1271, 17 U.S.P.Q2d at 1114.
The court considered its earlier holding, which imposed an obligation to give notice that
there was no acquiescence in the infringement when a patentee failed to timely sue an alleged
infringer, applicable here as well. Id. at 1272, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1114 (citingJamesbury Corp.,
839 F.2d at 1553, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1786).
377. Id. The court also rejected Adelberg's assertion that it was seeking damages only
since Abbott's license became nonexclusive, after which Cutter could no longer claim the
defense of a sublicense. Noting that the crucial dates were when Adelberg knew or should
have known of Cutter's alleged infringement and when Adelberg finally brought suit, the
court stated that "the time period during which Adelberg seeks damages is not decisive to the
defense of laches." Id. at 1272, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1115.
378. Id
379. Id at 1272-74, 17 U.S.P.O.2d at 1115-16 (outlining elements of estoppel and ac-
knowledging that while laches only bars "retrospective relief," estoppel precludes any asser-
tion of patent claim). Estoppel was established by a showing of "l) unreasonable and
inexcusable delay in filing suit, 2) prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay, 3) affirm-
ative conduct by the patentee to induce the belief that it had abandoned its claim, and 4)
detrimental reliance on the conduct by the accused infringer." Id. (citing Hottel Corp. v.
Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1939, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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justified a finding of prejudice.380 Further, affirmative actions by
Adelberg during the eleven-year delay, including numerous com-
munications in 1977 and 1978 between Adelberg and Abbott about
Cutter's alleged infringement, constituted affirmative acts on Adel-
berg's part.381 These actions, followed by the "long period of si-
lence by Adelberg and Abbott after first affirmatively asserting
patent infringement[,] suffice[d] to support the conclusion that
Adelberg and Abbott reasonably induced Cutter to believe that
Adelberg had abandoned its claim."3 8 2 The court emphasized that
bad faith was not a requirement of the estoppel defense; mere in-
ducement of the abandonment of one's claim is sufficient, regard-
less of whether it is done in good or bad faith.383
Interestingly, the court rejected the assertion that Cutter's "gen-
eration of documents in anticipation of being sued" 384 preduded an
estoppel defense. The court stated that "[c]ertainly Cutter might
have reasonably believed that Adelberg had abandoned its claim,
but still wanted to prepare itself in case Adelberg did bring a claim
against it."385 Thus, Cutter did not lose its right to rely on Adel-
berg's conduct by taking measures to protect itself from suit. This
result apparently contradicts the policy reasons behind the estoppel
defense, including avoiding prejudice that results from the delay.
Although prejudice may exist despite preparation for a law suit, it is
difficult to perceive how a party can both prepare for a law suit and
argue that it was surprised by that law suit. If the courts consistently
follow this holding, it could expand the scope of the estoppel de-
fense. Further, this holding could have the net effect of removing
from consideration of the estoppel defense the issue of whether the
defendant was truly surprised by the decision to bring an action.
The Adelberg case thus provides an interesting analysis on the use
of the laches and estoppel defenses in the licensor-sublicensor situa-
tion. Essentially, unless the patentee is aware of the existence and
terms of an agreement between its licensees and their sublicensees,
it must continue to take all actions to protect itself. The result is not
unreasonable, however, since the patentee is expected to investigate
all possible infringements and to act promptly in filing suit.
380. Id.
381. l. at 1273-74, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1115-16
382. Id. at 1274, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1116.
383. Id-
384. IE
385. See id (stating that reasonable belief does not require showing of complete confi-
dence that claim was abandoned).
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XVIII. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
In 1990, the Federal Circuit decided three cases in the highly vol-
atile area of inequitable conduct. The three cases addressed such
issues as whether a determination that one patent-in-suit is pro-
cured by inequitable conduct requires a holding that two related
patents are unenforceable;38 6 whether the filing of a Rule 312
amendment that did not "substantially" alter the claims as filed con-
stituted inequitable conduct;3 87 and whether inequitable conduct
exists where the conduct in question relates only to rejected
claims.3
88
In Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International, Ltd. ,389 which
raised an issue of first impression, the Federal Circuit considered
whether the doctrine of unclean hands requires a holding that all
related patents-in-suit are unenforceable if any one patent-in-suit is
determined to be tainted by inequitable conduct.390 The court re-
sponded in the affirmative, upholding the district court's determina-
tion that three related patents-in-suit were unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct during the procurement of one.39 '
In Consolidated Aluminum, the plaintiff-patentee, Consolidated Alu-
minum, asserted six patents related to ceramic foam filters for mol-
ten metal.392 The district court found that Consolidated Aluminum
intentionally concealed the best mode, and disclosed a fictitious, in-
operable mode during the prosecution of one of those patents, and
was therefore guilty of inequitable conduct during the prosecution
of that patent. As a result of that inequitable conduct, and because
of the "significant relationship between and among" three of the
other patents and the patent procured by deception, the district
court refused to enforce the three related patents. 393
The Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's guidance in
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.3 94 and Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.395 to con-
386. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 15 U.S.P.Q2d
1481 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
387. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.O,2d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
388. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., No. 89-1353, 90-1304 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file).
389. 910 F.2d 804, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
390. Consolidated Aluminum, 910 F.2d at 809-10, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1485.
391. Id. at 812, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1487.
392. Id- at 806, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1482.
393. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 716 F. Supp. 316, 331-32, 11
U.S.P.Q 2d 1817, 1829 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aft'd, 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
394. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
395. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
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dude that the district court's action was not an abuse of discretion.
First, the court reviewed the district court's reason for concluding
that one of the patents was tainted by inequitable conduct-the pat-
entee's misrepresentation of the best mode.39 6 Then, the court re-
viewed the relationships between that patent and the three
additional patents affected.397 For each patent, the court found
more than "mere relatedness of subject matter."398 Rather, "Con-
solidated's inequitable conduct in prosecuting the [tainted] patent
had 'immediate and necessary relation' . . . to the equity [it sought],
namely enforcement of the [three related] patents. ' 399 Thus, the
court concluded that "[t]he concealment of the CS1-B slurry from
the '917 patent enabled Consolidated to present the CS 1-B slurry as
part of the invention disclosure in the '081 specification and as a
basis for its successful arguments in prosecuting the applications
that became the other patents-in-suit." 400 Because two other pat-
ents were from continuations-in-part of the '081 patent, they too
were unenforceable.
The court distinguished its holding in SSIH Equipment S.A. v.
United States International Trade Commission,401 which concerned al-
leged inequitable conduct during the prosecution of patents not in
suit.40 2 The court stated that the teachings of Keystone Driller and
Precision Instrument do not require fraud on the court, and noted that
"requiring fraud before the court would be at odds with Precision
Instrument which held that withholding information from the PTO
[Patent and Trademark Office] so soiled the patentee's hands as to
render all patents-in-suit unenforceable."
40 3
Consolidated Aluminum unequivocally adopts the unclean hands
teachings of Keystone Driller and Precision Instrument, and requires a
finding of unenforceability for all related patents-in-suit where one of
the related patents was procured by inequitable conduct before the
Patent and Trademark Office. Consolidated Aluminum should not be
read to preclude a similar result when the fraud is on the court. In
396. Consolidated Aluminum, 910 F.2d at 807-09, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1483-84.
397. Id. at 811-12, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1486-87.
398. Id. at 810, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1486.
399. Id. at 810-11, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1486 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. General Exca-
vator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (citation omitted)).
400. Id at 811, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at'1486 (footnote omitted).
401. 718 F.2d 365, 218 U.S.P.Q.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
402. Consolidated Aluminum, 910 F.2d at 812, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1487. It appears that Consol-
idated Aluminum was not the only case to misread SSIH. One author has incorrectly asserted
that "[t]he court responded to SSIH's claim of infectious unenforceability by rejecting the
claim unequivocally." Casey, "Infectious Unenforceability" The Extent or Reach of Inequitable Con-
duct on Associated Patents, 17 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.A.QJ. 338, 345 (1989).
403. Id. at 812, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1487.
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fact, it seems clear that this latter circumstance would require the
same result.
The court addressed the effect of a Rule 312 Amendment on the
inequitable conduct analysis in Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint
Corp.404 During prosecution of the patent-in-suit, the examiner, af-
ter rejecting the application on various grounds, eventually allowed
the claims substantially as filed. After the notice of allowance, but
before payment of the issuance fee, Northern Telecom requested
amendment of the descriptive text of the application, pursuant to
Rule 312.405 Northern Telecom represented the amendments to be
"for the purpose of correcting certain typographical errors and
other such discrepancies. ' 40 6 The district court viewed the changes
made by the Rule 312 amendment as altering the scope of the origi-
nal disclosure and of the previously allowed claims.40 7 As such, the
court felt that they constituted a misrepresentation material to pat-
entability, rendering the patent unenforceable.
408
The Federal Circuit disagreed. The court noted first that the Rule
312 amendments "were not to the claims," and that "the subject
matter added to the descriptive text by [the Rule 312] amendment
was already in the allowed claims."' 40 9 Then, focusing on whether
intent to deceive had been shown, the court placed the burden of
determining the effect of the amendments on the examiner in situa-
tions where all relevant information is provided. "Although lapse
on the part of an examiner does not exculpate an application whose
acts are intentionally deceptive, . . .any doubt as to whether the
examiner lapsed in his duty does not increase the burden on the
applicant." 410 Without a showing that the applicant actually in-
tended to deceive the examiner by its introductory remarks to the
Rule 312 amendment, the court held that it was legal error for the
404. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
405. 37 C.F.R. § 1.312 (1969). Section 1.312 provides:
Amendments after the notice of allowance of an application will not be permitted as
a-matter of right. However, such amendments may be made iffiled not later than the
date the issue fee is paid, on the recommendation of the primary examiner, approved
by the Commissioner, without withdrawing the case from issue.
Idt
406. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint, 908 F.2d 931, 937, 15 U.S.P.Q2d 1321, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 938, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1326-27 (holding that purpose and nature of amend-
ments was intentionally misrepresented and supported finding of inequitable conduct).
409. Idt, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1326 (determining that claims were already part of disclosure
and amendments were clear on their face).
410. Idt at 938-39, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1327 (stating presumption that public officials per-
form mandatory duties and examiner was not diverted or misled by patentee's representation
of amendments).
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trial court to conclude that inequitable conduct existed. 41'
The third case in which the court considered the inequitable con-
duct defense was Fox Industries, Inc. v. Structural Preservation Systems,
Inc.4 12 In Fox Industries, the court upheld a determination of inequi-
table conduct based on misrepresentations that related solely to
claims rejected by the PTO. The court determined that the inequi-
table conduct analysis is not limited to consideration of the claims
allowed. Instead, "a trial court may look beyond the final claims to
their antecedents. ' 4 13 The court concluded that a breach of the
duty of candor at any time in the prosecution "may render unen-
forceable all claims which eventually issue from the same or a re-
lated application."
414
Fox Industries makes clear what has been implicit in the court's in-
equitable conduct decisions from the start-that questionable activi-
ties during the prosecution of a patent will render the entire patent
unenforceable regardless of the focus of those misrepresentations.
This result, though seemingly draconian, is warranted by the need
for candor by patent attorneys in a system which, because of its ex
parte nature, is completely reliant on the prosecutors' good faith.
411. Id. at 939-40, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1327-28 (holding that there must be clear and con-
vincing evidence to support finding of intent to deceive and, consequently, inequitable
conduct).
412. No. 89-1353, 90-1304, slip op. at I (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 1990).
413. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Preservation Sys., Inc., slip op. at 4 (holding that claims
do not exist in isolation) (quoting Kingstown Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
874, 9 U.S.P.O.2d 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
414. Id
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